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Summary
The main object of this study is the growth and
distribution of individual earnings in segmented labour
markets. The thesis focuses on the micro-economic level
and provides a stochastic framework for different wage
structures or income promotion ladders.
The study critically discusses the Markovian
property which characterizes the existing stochastic models
of personal income distribution and, consequently, limits
their applicability in dealing with different wage struc¬
tures. The rigid formulation of these models does not
provide an adequate insight into the distribution of
earnings, since it does not allow for factors known to
influence income promotion rates such as seniority within
the income level and length-of-service.
The thesis also traces the various aspects of the
segmented labour market hypothesis with particular reference
to internal labour markets which exhibit stable employment
relations and idiosyncratic job content at the firm level.
In the suggested stochastic models a change in earnings
is identified with an event that occurs across the employee's
length-of-service, and the growth of earnings is generated
by a point process. Initially the distribution of earnings
is derived within a firm subject to a particular wage
structure or within a family of firms belonging to a single
wage structure. On specific assumptions regarding the
income promotion rates analytical solutions are obtained
with particular attention given to the inequality of the
distributions which is shown to depend upon seniority within
the income level. At a later stage the distribution of
earnings across different wage structures is also considered.
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Since firms follow income promoting policies based
on age, ability or length-of-service these factors are
incorporated into the model. Finally a proposed model
for the distribution of earnings of the self-employed and
of workers in markets of the secondary sector takes into
account income demotions.
The last part of the study provides a synthesis of
the known consumption hypotheses focusing on the relation
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The models presented in this thesis are stochastic.
Thus from a methodological point of view our work is
based on the traditional application of stochastic processes
to models generating size distributions of economic variables
such as wealth, income and the size of the firm.
Apart from models specifically referred to in our
survey of literature chapter, one should mention the model
of Wold and Whittle1 who applied a birth-and-death process
to the wealth variable, although their treatment of the
increase of wealth is deterministic. Like most of these
models in the field of economics Wold and Whittle assumed
that wealth is a stock or a population of monetary units,
o
Steindl treated the number of a firm's customers
as the measure of its size,and applied a homogeneous birth-
and-death process to the population of customers. In a
similar model he applied a general random walk process to
the firm's stock of capital, which increases with received
claims and decreases with outlays on the cost of the
business.
3
Adelman applied a Markov chain in order to describe
the size distribution of firms and the concentration of the
4
steel industry in the U.S.A. Newman and Wolfe examined
the same problem for any industry. They divided the possible
output range of an industry into a large number of size
classes and applied a Markov chain. Within a quasi-stochastic
framework they treated the transition matrix of the process
as an increasing continuous function of price.
Finally, we should mention the more recent work of
Shorrocks0 who applied a non-homogeneous birth-and-death
process with "immigration" to a stock of monetary units
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representing the wealth of an individual, and he derived
the distribution of wealth within a homogeneous group of
individuals having the same age.
Our claim for the originality of this thesis is
three-fold. First we provide a mathematical framework
within which earnings distributions in segmented labour
markets, with different wage structures or income ladders,
can be analyzed. The second novelty of this presentation
lies in the application of point processes to the distri¬
bution of an economic variable such as income. These
processes are basically non-Markovian and to our knowledge
they have not been applied to economics. An original
point in our exposition is the treatment of income promo¬
tion rates as akin to hazard functions, and the assumption
- fairly general - that they are functions of seniority
within each income level. We must note, however, that our
models are not related to any man-power planning model.
Therefore problems of vacancies or rationing of jobs are
not considered significant and they are omitted, since
income increases are not necessarily identified with job
levels or promotions. Thirdly an interesting repercussion
of our length-of-service model is the suggested relation
between individual consumption and earnings in internal
labour markets.
Although our models and the suggested consumption
hypothesis can be subjected to empirical verification this
task has not been undertaken due to lack of relevant data;
this area still requires further research.
A shortcoming of the thesis is the assumption of
constant exit rates of employees in our basic model.
Perhaps a more realistic model would treat the exit rate
- 2 -
as a decreasing function of the length-of-service.
Although we devoted substantial work to this area we
realised that we could not obtain any explicit results,
mainly due to integration problems. We based our results
on the negative exponential form of the length-of-service
distribution and on the theory of Laplace transforms.
A distribution that would not complicate the deri¬
vation of explicit results in our basic model and would
be more realistic, is the mixed exponential with a proba¬
bility density function of the form
-brn^s -bnigS
f(s) = p bm^e + q boig e , where b is the rate of
entry into the firm per employee, and rr^ are two differ¬
ent rates of exit, and p, q are probabilities so that
p + q = 1.
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chapter 1: "functional and personal incomes distributions:
a distinction:'
The aim of this thesis is to provide a mathematical
model for the growth and personal distribution of pretax
money earnings (salaries and wages), which form the largest
part of individual incomes; but as an introductory step
it seems worth referring briefly to the theories of the
functional incomes distribution and exposing the loose, and
still questionable, connection that exists between these
theories and topics strictly related to the personal incomes
distribution approach.
The functional incomes distribution theory examines
the incomes accrued to the factors of production; it is
related to the division of national income into broad aggre¬
gates such as wages, rent, interest and profits. As far as
the wage theory is concerned the functional incomes distri¬
bution concentrates upon the determination of the wage rate
and upon the share of labour in the national income. The
wage rate is defined as the price paid to labour per unit of
time (usually per hour) for a particular kind of work.
On the other hand, the personal incomes distribution
theory focuses upon the total income of an individual, the
theory of earnings being a particular case of it.
- 5 -
A. The Classical Theories.
In the classical theories the functional incomes
distribution is treated as being the outcome of social
institutions and social relations. Prices and the rate
of profit are simultaneously determined once the wage is
known and, consequently, the determination of wages and
of the surplus remains outside the prices scheme.
The concept of surplus or net product is of critical
importance in the classical theory of distribution. Within
the competitive capitalist framework the surplus is defined
as the non-wage revenue, and it is determined by the methods
of production and the wage, given the social output. The
social output is composed of the requirements of production,
accumulation and social consumption. Smith and Ricardo
considered customs and habits as basic determinants of
social consumption.
The classical economists drew an important distinction
between "market prices" and "natural prices". The former are
susceptible to influences of temporary or accidental causes
deviating from natural prices which are considered relevant
for the distribution problem. The fluctuations occur because
of temporary monopoly advantages, changes in fashion, political
events, etc.
Both the rate of profit and of prices are uniquely
determined once the real wage is specified. The real wage is
taken as given and according to Smith1 it is determined by
measuring the labour commanded.
Ricardo argued that the wage rate is determined by
taking both the amount of labour employed and the total wage
fund as fixed. Ricardo accepted the Malthusian doctrine of
the natural price of labour, that is the equalization of
- 6 -
wages to the level necessary for the subsistence and per¬
petuation of the work-force. He, however, supported the
thesis that the subsistence wage was socially determined
by habits and customs.
The dynamic factor in Ricardo's analysis is profit;
it results from the difference between wages and the product
of labour on marginal land. The latter is determined in
equilibrium by the fixed amount of labour, given technical
knowledge and the fertility of land.
In the corn economy, the simplest version of Ricardian
analysis, the rate of profit percent on capital employed is
* 1
defined as the ratio of corn profit to the stock of corn
In equilibrium there is a uniform rate of profit in all sectors
of the economy, the corn rate of profit in agriculture regula¬
ting the money rate of profit in the industrial sectors.
3
Malthus raised the objection that wage goods do not
consist of corn exclusively; if workers change their consump¬
tion patterns, the determination of the rate of profit entails
the comparison of heterogeneous quantities such as total out¬
put, wages and total investment susceptible to price changes
which in turn depend upon changes in the profit rate itself.
* 2
This circularity problem made the rate of profit seem
indeterminate and rendered the underlying relations between
profits and wages uncertain. Ricardo's quest of an invariant
measure of value that would eliminate the interdependence
between the rate of profit and relative prices did not end,





For a discussion of the circularity problem in the Ricardian theory
of profit see Dobb 4 and Mrs. Robinson.5
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Finally, Ricardo pointed out that the limit to profits
is set by the conditions of production and that there is an
inevitable inverse relation between the share of wages and
0
the profit rate. Malthus challenged this proposition of
the inverse relation by arguing that a rise in wages could
be compensated by a rise in prices,and hence would not
necessarily be followed by a decline in the rate of profit.
Marx's theory of distribution is based upon the
division of the total product between labour and capital.
7
Marx suggested that the realization of profits can be
explained in terms of the surplus value created in production
by labour, since labour power contributes to the value of
the product more than it receives. Therefore workers are
exploited by capitalists, while wages are kept near some
historically conditioned subsistence level by the industrial
reserve army of labour created by the capitalist process.
According to Marx the distribution of income between
capital and labour is influenced by the "class struggle",
changes in technology, population growth, the organisation
of workers and the expansion of capitalist production to new
markets.
Both Ricardo and Marx were aware of the deviation of
labour values from the competitive prices of production. The
application of labour values as an invariant standard appears
to be explained by Ricardo's effort to clarify certain analy¬
tical relations relevant to distribution theory and to
establish them in the sphere of production. Marx argued that
the labour theory of value not only clarified these distribu¬
tion relations, but also offered an analysis to the process
of generation and appropriation of surplus.
- 8 -
The non-equivalence of labour values and prices of
production (the transformation problem) still remains one
of the weaker points of the classical theories.
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B. The Theories of Kalecki and Kaldor.
Between the classical theories and the much
celebrated neoclassical theory stand the two theories of
Kalecki and Kaldor.
g
Kalecki divides the economy into three sectors
producing (a) investment goods, (b) consumption goods for
capitalists and (c) wage goods. He makes the following
general assumptions; first he considers a proportional
rise of all wage rates in a closed economic system. As a
result of the rise of wage rates the annual wage bill
increases in a particular short period and the workers
spend all their income immediately. Secondly the consump¬
tion and the investment decisions of capitalists are made
before the short period considered so that they are not
affected by the wage rise in this period. Since capitalists
determine their investment and consumption on current
experience they will not be inclined to reduce them just
after the wages rise.
Kalecki examines two cases: on the assumption of
perfect competition he argues that a rise in wage rates
causes a proportional rise in prices at the given levels of
respective outputs so that profits in sectors (a) and (b)
rise in the same proportion as wages. In sector (c) profits
will rise as well, since they are equal to the income obtained
from the sales of wage goods to the workers of the sectors
( a) an d (b).
In the case of imperfect competition Kalecki assumes
that each firm in an industry has the discretion to quote
administered prices for its product on a cost and "mark-up"
basis. The firm's direct costs u consist of the average
costs of wages plus raw materials. The price set by the
- 10 -
firm depends on the degree of monopoly, that is on the
relation of the ensuing price p to the weighted average
price of the product p for the industry as a whole.
Therefore
where f is an increasing function; the lower p is in
A
relation to p, the higher the mark up will be fixed. The
function f reflects semi-monopolistic influences and the
higher the degree of imperfect competition, the higher is
/\ A
f(2.) corresponding to a given relation £.
The function f is, consequently, susceptible to
Union pressure. The prices p may be different for different
firms since firms usually experience different costs u or
different functions f.
Kalecki argues that a general increase in wages, or
an increase in all costs u with given functions f will make
prices rise by the same amount. If the direct cost u^
increases only for a single firm, then the price set by that
firm p^ will increase in a smaller proportion because the
average price for the industry p will not rise in the same
proportion as u^..
Under the assumption of excess capacities in an
imperfect competitive structure, Kalecki concludes that in
a closed system of this type a general increase in money
wage rates will not change the distribution of national
income, provided that the functions f particular to the
various industries remain the same. There is, however, a
possibility of redistribution if the Trade Unions manage to
restrain the mark-up prices, but since the prices are not
stable in the system a rise in wages is to a great extent
shifted to the consumers.
- 11 -
9
Kaldor's model of functional incomes distribution
is based upon the Keynesian equations
Y = C + I
I = S
AS = sAY = AI,
where total income Y is given (he assumes a state of full
employment), s is the marginal propensity to save and the
investment is also supposed to be given.
Kaldor assumes that there are two groups of income
recipients, the wage-earners and the profit recipients, so
that Y = W + P. Each group has a different marginal pro¬
pensity to save, namely the workers' marginal propensity to
save is sw and the capitalists' one is s^. The two partial
marginal propensities to save combined give an average
marginal propensity s that should satisfy the Keynesian
equation I = S.
Kaldor considers simple proportional savings functions
S = s W and S = s P, where S snd S are the aggregate
SW P P W p tototo
savings out of wages and profits respectively, and the
marginal propensities are equal to the average ones. Since
S = S + S we have
w p
S W P
S = sW+sPor^ = stt + S v-w p Y wY p Y
SI P
But y=Y'^ = Y - P and solving for y we obtain
P II ^
v = — v ~ • Accordingly the share of labourI S_ ~~ S I s — s
p w p w
w 1 I
is tt = — (s -77). Therefore the shares of profit andYs-svpY ^
p w ^
labour in income depend on the ratio of investment to output
and on the two propensities to save, all known quantities.
The critical assumption in Kaldor's model is that the ratio
of investment to output is independent of the changes in the
- 12 -
* 3
two savings propensities. Assuming that investment
decisions depend upon profit expectations the model is
stable at full employment and only when s^ > sw the
difference between the two propensities determining the
degree of stability of the system.
This particular point has been severely critized by Pen.1^
- 13 -
C. The Neoclassical Theory of Distribution.
The neoclassical theory is based on the market
mechanism and interprets relative prices as being formed
at the equilibrium between the opposite and symmetric
forces of demand and supply. Land, labour and capital are
viewed as factors of production with their own markets in
which the factor prices are determined by the operation of
supply and demand forces as in the case of individual
commodities. More particularly, the wage rate is deter¬
mined by the supply and demand of labour. The demand curve
of labour is derived from the demand curve of the final pro¬
duct it helped to produce.
The theoretical foundations of the neoclassical theory
of distribution lie in the theory of marginal productivity.
The idea of marginal productivity originated in the theories
* 4
of von Thunen and Longfield but this doctrine was completed
* 5
more clearly developed by J. B. Clark who identified it
with a natural law.
The theory examines a hypothetical static state in
which technical progress is absent and dynamic factors that
could introduce an element of risk and uncertainty are not
operative. Another basic assumption is the existence of
perfect competition. In this system the only sources of
income are wages, rent and interest, while entrepreneurial
profit corresponds to reward for managerial labour; thus





J.B.Clark wrote: "The aim of my work is to show that the
distribution of society's income is controlled by natural law,
and that this law, if it operates unhindered, gives each agent
of production the amount of the wealth that he has created."
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Since the topic of this thesis is the distribution
of earnings in segmented labour markets we will examine
the theory of marginal productivity by focusing our atten¬
tion upon the determination of the level of wages. According
to the proponents of the theory the level of wages is deter¬
mined by production optimization processes at the level of
individual firms. The theory requires that the wage rate
is equal to the marginal product of labour. The marginal
product of any factor of production can only be defined by
means of the production function and so far as labour is
concerned it is the extra output produced by the additional
employment of one extra worker; in mathematical terms the
marginal product of labour is derived as the partial deriva¬
tive of the firm's production function with respect to labour.
The neoclassical theory was extended from the micro-
economic concepts to the field of aggregate values,and the
shares of labour and capital in the national income are
derived from the aggregate production function as the
elasticities of the production function with respect to
labour and capital. The neoclassical production function
is of the form Q = f(K,L), where Q is output, K is capital
and L is labour; the share of profit is totally ignored.
Two types of production function are known in the literature,
the Cobb-Douglas one and the one known as Constant Elasticity
1 3
of Substitution function. The Cobb-Douglas function is of
the following mathematical form:
3- 1—3,
Q = AL K , where A is a constant and the exponents
a, 1-a represent the shares of labour and capital respectively.
On the other hand the mathematical form of the CES
-p * • 14function is
Q = Y { 5k~p + (1 - 5) L~5} p ,
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where the functional distribution of income is determined
by the parameter 5.
In the Cobb-Douglas production function the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labour is one, therefore
the share of capital (or labour) is not influenced by capital
accumulation, while the elasticity of substitution of the
CES function is less than one, implying that capital accumu¬
lation increases the share of labour.
In the classical theory the primary problem was the
identification of the principles governing the distribution
of functional incomes, principles that were independent from
those governing the production process; the functional income
distribution process was treated as being the outcome of
social institutions and social relations. The important
feature of neoclassical analysis is that it renders the
functional incomes distribution an essentially pricing process,
since the remuneration of the factors of production is
determined by the prices of the final products which in turn
are explained by the conditions of exchange.
In the classical theory of distribution the value of
the product is derived from its factor costs; prices and
the rate of profit are simultaneously determined once the
wage is known, while the determination of wages and of surplus
remains outside the prices schema. On the other hand, the
neoclassical theory of distribution traces the value of the
factor from that of the product whose production it has
contributed to, therefore the distribution and pricing problems
are identically solved within the same process of price deter¬
mination .
The marginal productivity theory has been criticized on
both the question of finding the production optimum and the
- 16 -
problem of imputation. The optimum combination of the
factors of production is established through the comparison
of successive increments in a certain production factor with
the resulting increments in output, given that the level of
technology and the prices of the factor and output are held
constant. The optimum is defined as the maximum output for
a given volume of production costs reached as an outcome of
that combination of resources by means of which the value of
the increase in output, with a marginal increment in any of
the factors, equals the price of the latter. Therefore the
basis of comparison is the elaboration of linear homogeneous
* 7
production functions of a microeconomic nature reflecting
optimal quantitative dependences between output and cost,
and also guaranteeing substitutability of the factors of pro¬
duction.
The practical consequences of this process, however,
are limited for three reasons; first in many cases it is
extremely difficult to calculate the necessary marginal values.
Secondly the role of technical innovation is completely
neglected, since we assume a given level of technology.
Thirdly, the comparison of different combinations of factors
entails the assumption of continuous substitutability of the
production resources while in reality there are very few
possibilities for the substitutability of factors, and these
are largely determined by prevailing technical norms.
Another basic problem in the theory of imputation is
the relationship between the marginal product of a factor and
its remuneration. According to the theory the income of any
* 6 15
For a critical discussion of the neoclassical theory see Alam.
* 7 16
See Schultz.
factor of production is equal to its marginal product
multiplied by the price of the final product in the commodity
market. Consequently, total income equals the total
marginal products of factors evaluated on the basis of
commodity price; the value of commodities, being equal to
the sum of income of the factors, becomes also equal to the
total value of the factors' marginal products. The equaliza¬
tion of values of marginal products with the income of
factors is realized through the joint action of the law of
diminishing returns and the mechanism of perfect competitive
markets. The entrepreneur in the perfect competitive market,
seeking to obtain a certain amount of output at a minimum
cost, arrives at an optimal combination of resources where
the value of marginal products is equal to the corresponding
income; this equality, however, does not hold when there are
imperfections in the market.
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D. Conclusions.
From this brief survey of the theories of functional
distribution of incomes two conclusions can be derived.
First the problem of the personal incomes distribution was
not emphasized by the classical economists, while the models
of Kaldor and Kalecki were solely concentrated on the factor
shares.
Secondly the microeonomic part of the neoclassical
theory provides an explicit answer to the problem of deter¬
mining the size of the personal incomes but their distribu¬
tion is not explained. Regarding the former problem, the
difficulties mentioned earlier have not yet been overcome.
The marginal productivity theory is not operative in an
imperfect competitive market, while in many groups of wage
or salary earners the concept of marginal product is rather
vague and it cannot be easily determined, the services sector
being an obvious example. But even if the marginal product
of a worker can be estimated quantitatively there are other
factors of institutional and sociological nature that may
distort the picture, and jointly determine the wage structure.
In addition, the Trade Unions from the supply side and the
job evaluation schemes of large corporations from the demand
side could seriously affect the distribution and determina¬
tion of labour incomes.
It was generally assumed that there was some connection
between the functional and personal distribution of incomes,
but for the modern industrialized economies the relation appears
to be ambiguous.
1 7
Bron fen brenner points out that an apparent connection
between functional and personal incomes distribution is
incorporated in the following two propositions, we quote,
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"a) the larger the individual's income on the average, the smaller
the proportion that is derived from wages and salaries,
b) any measure that increases the labor share of the functional
distribution will increase the equality of the personal one".
The author argues that the above propositions are
half-truths. The major difficulty with the former is the
existence of widows, orphans, pensioners and workers
receiving supplementary incomes from rental of house property
at the lower tail of the functional incomes distribution.
The latter proposition is correct only if total income dis¬
tributed does not fall at the same time; due to the fluctua¬
tions of profit, the labour share falls in prosperity and
rises in depression, while the coefficient of concentration
within the labour incomes should move upward in prosperity
and downward in depression.
Bron fenbrenner, however, points out that there is
some statistical evidence that shows that in fact the labour
share is distributed more equally in prosperity since part
time work and unemployment during the depression period
increase the coefficient of concentration of labour incomes.
Our basic aim in this chapter has been to emphasize
the fact that there might be some vague relation between
functional shares and the coefficient of concentration of
labour incomes, but the theories of functional incomes dis¬
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CHAPTER 2: "A SURVEY OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE"
A. A Brief History of the Personal Incomes Distribution.
We believe that a brief introduction to the
pioneering work in the field of personal incomes distri¬
bution is worth being undertaken because, to say the least,
it reveals the fallacies and short-comings that until
recently prevailed. For many economists, nowadays, the
quest of an overall size distribution of incomes is an
obvious Utopia, but for the two pioneers in the field,
Pareto and Gibrat, it was the central point of research.
V.Pareto's law1 was the empirical derivation of a
curve from income tax data corresponding to various
countries, such as Britain, Saxony, Peru, Florence etc.
Pareto observed a certain regularity in the data and he
thought that the following algebraic formula fitted the
data well: F(y) = Ay , where F(y) is the number of
incomes exceeding y, A is a constant related to the units
of measurement and a is a parameter which controls all
the known measures of inequality. The larger the value of
the Pareto coefficient, a, the smaller the inequality and
vice versa. Pareto believed that probability (chance)
played little role in the generation of his universal law
and that the numerical value of the coefficient a was
nearly the same over the data to which he applied his law.
The above two assertions, however, proved to be incorrect;
we will see later on in this chapter that D.G.Champernowne
derived the Pareto law from a Markov chain. In fact
2
J.A.C.Brown pointed out that by means of variations on
the central limit theorem random processes can generate
Pareto's law among other final distributions. So far as
the second assertion is concerned empirical research has
- 23 -
found that the value of a varies with the degree of
economic growth; in poor countries, where there is
great inequality, the coefficient a has a small value,
3
a figure of 1.5 according to J.Pen. In more developed
countries with greater equality a higher value of a has
been found. Pareto himself had also accepted the fact
that a disaggregation of incomes by source gives rise
to different curves related to different values of the
coefficient. In chapter five we will establish that,
according to certain assumptions in our basic model, the
distribution of earnings in a firm can follow the Pareto
distribution with the coefficient being governed by certain
parameters of economic significance which can give rise to
various curves of the Pareto form. Since, nowadays, it is
universally accepted that the Pareto's formula fits well
only the tail of the income distribution (the higher incomes)
the validity of the Pareto coefficient as a measure of
inequality in the whole income structure seems to be doubtful.
The only similarity that appears to exist between
* i
Pareto's law and R.Gibrat's log-normal distribution is the
empirical orientation of their work. Gibrat, unlike Pareto,
focussed his attention upon the forces of chance, and by apply¬
ing the powerful central limit theorem to his law of propor¬
tionate effect he derived the log-normal distribution of
incomes. The law of proportionate effect, quoting from
* 1 4
Actually Gibrat considered the more general case of
x = a log (y -yQ) +b and showed that x is normally distributed.
In the above expression a, y and b are constants, y corres¬
ponds to a minimum income, not necessarily the minimum




J. Aitchison and J.A.C.Brown, can be defined as follows:
"A variate subject to a process of change is said to obeg the law
of proportionate effect if the change in the variate at any step of
the process is a random proportion of the previous value of the variate".
Suppose that the following relationship links income at
period t_ with income at period t - 1:
+ £-(-)• If the individual started with initial
income y , then the above relationship taken recursively
becomes: y = y (1 + 1 + e2) (l+et).
Taking the logarithm of both sides we obtain
.t
log y+. = log yn + '2 log (1 +£.). Provided thatx
i=l 1
{log (1 +e^)} is a set of independent random variables, and
for time t_ sufficiently large the random variables {log y^l,
according to the central limit theorem, follow the normal
distribution; in other words the income variate is dis¬
tributed as a two-parameter log-normal variate. The log-
normal distribution fits fairly well the middle ranges of
the income distribution, but it provides a poor fit for the
tails. On the other hand, a particular deficiency of the
log-normal distribution is that its variance increases as
the process is continued (the longer the law of proportionate
effect is in operation), while empirical evidence shows that
the parameter (a2 t) is constant over time.
0
M. Kalecki suggested that economic forces keep the
standard deviation of the logarithm of income constant. This
assumption implies a negative correlation between log y_t_1
and log (1 +et), and assuming that the regression of
log (1 on log yt_1 is linear, we have
log (1 +£-j-) = log yt_^ +nt> where is a constant and




y = yt_1 e and under fairly general conditions
Kalecki has shown that the final distribution of the
income variate y_ is approximately log-normal. The imposed
operation of the negative correlation assumption is an
artificial and rather arbitrary stabilizing influence
which has been neither explained nor properly justified.
J. Aitchison and J.A.C.Brown tried also to resolve the
apparent inconsistency of the increasing variance by
introducing a birth-and-death process of the income holders
as a stabilizing factor. They argued that there is con¬
sistent evidence that in a number of professions (U.S.A.
and U.K) the variance of the income distribution increases
systematically with the age of the profession's members.
More specifically the earnings of an individual through
life are described by a stochastic process of the form
y^ + ^ = e^^^ +u}yt, where the function f(t) describes
the path of the median income through life and u is a
normal variable with zero mean and independent of the
individual's age _t.
Although no actual explanation is given regarding
the path of the median income, the fact that the individual's
limited life-span constrains the variance of income seems to
us a far more realistic assumption than the one suggested by
Kalecki.
In our opinion Gibrat's absolute reliance on the
central limit theorem is responsible for the confusion and
scepticism which portray the economists' prevailing attitude
towards stochastic models. It is generally believed that a
stochastic model establishes the growth of personal incomes
as the outcome of a large number of small additive random
- 26 -
effects which act independently from each other; it is
true that human behaviour is unpredictable and this element
of uncertainty, which is more obvious in the social
sciences, can only be incorporated in the stochastic models.
But, unlike Gibrat's model, there are certain economic
sociological and institutional factors which systematically
influence and, sometimes, determine the laws of probability.
* 2
At a later stage in this thesis we will come back
to this very important point that can be successfully




B. Stochastic Models of Personal Incomes Distribution
The observed similarity in the pattern of size
distribution of personal incomes was the motivating force
behind the application of stochastic models to the income
distribution theory. The final size distributions were
conceptualized as the steady state equilibria resulting
after the stochastic process had been in operation for a
sufficiently large time; and the final size distribution
was seen to be the outcome of a great many random changes.
The processes applied were Markovian in nature,
basically Markov chains, and they have been criticized on
many grounds. The determination of the matrix of transi¬
tion probabilities independent of the initial distribution
does not give an insight into the latter, leaving it
unexplained. The variance of income in these models
increases with time contrary to existing evidence. We have
to note, however, that stabilizing conditions were intro¬
duced to constrain the ever-increasing variance.
The major criticism raised against the stochastic
models was that observed inequality is attributed to mere
chance. More specifically this is related to the Markovian
character of the models. By assuming that the transition
probabilities are the same for all levels of income and
independent of the former history of the process factors
such as seniority within the income level, length-of-service,
abilities or age are ignored. Finally the rigidity of the
formulation excludes the possibility of the existence of
different stochastic processes for various groups of
7
individuals. Champernowne, nowever, considered this point
by making allowance for the existence of homogeneous




I Champernowne's Model (a Markov chain)
Champernowne introduces a minimum income, say ym^n >
below which incomes cannot possibly fall. Starting off from
y . , an infinite number of successive income classesmm'
j,j = 1,2, ... are marked-off by class limits that are
equidistant on a logarithmic scale; if their width on
such a scale is h, the jth income class refers to the
income interval y . e*1^-^. y . e11"'. There is an•'mm ' •'mm
enumerable infinity of these intervals. They can be made
as small as we choose. Let us consider the movement
across these income classes from one discrete time period
to the next. An individual income recipient who at time t
belongs to income class r may move to income class s at
time (t+1); the probability of this move is denoted as
the transition probability p(r,s,t). If P(r,t) denotes
the probability of an individual belonging to income class r
at time t, we have P(s,t+1) = £ p(r,s,t)P(r,t) ..(1)
r
This equation brings out that the behaviour of the probab¬
ility density P(s,t) over time is determined by the trans¬
ition probabilities p(r,s,t). Champernowne makes a number
of assumptions about these transition probabilities and
some of these assumptions are justified only for large
values of s and r (among the higher incomes). There are
three main assumptions. First, the p(r,s,t) are constants,
independent of time. Secondly, they are equally independent
of the income levels r and s, and determined fully by
u = s -r, according to the "law of proportionate effect"
the probability of a jump from one income class to another
depends only on the width of the jump, but not on the posi¬
tion from which we jump off. Finally, income movement is
restricted to the interval (-k,1) so that income may at
- 29 -
most move one class up or k classes down. It follows from
these assumptions that we may write the transition proba¬
bilities p(r,s,t) as p(u), where u = s-r and p(u) = 0 for
u >1 or u < -k, then we can replace (1) by
1
P(s,t+1) = 2 p(u) P(s-n,t) -.(2)
n = -k
The process can be represented in terms of a vector P(t),
with elements P(s,t), and of a transition matrix A(t)
with elements p(r,s,t). In this notation (2) is written
as P(t +1) = A(t)P(t). . . (3)
Since the transition probabilities are independent of
time and apply to any income recipient who is in income
class r at time t, regardless of his former history (i.e.
the state of his income at t-1, t-2 ...), the process is
* 3
known as a homogeneous Markov chain. We may denote the
transition matrix by A, deleting the time index, and it can
be seen from (3) that the probability distribution P(t)
which is generated by the repeated application of the
process to a given initial frequency distribution P(0) is
given by P(t) =AtP(0). ..(4)
There are three restrictions related to the transition prob¬
abilities, p(u) > 0 for all u
2 P (u) = 1
u = -k
1
and 2 u p(u) < 0,
u = -k
the stability condition which means that the mathematical
expectation of ranges shifted is always a shrinkage of
income from whatever income one starts. This restriction
* 3
The transition times related to the income changes, seen as events
of the underlying point process, follow the geometric distribution
which plays the role of the negative exponential one in discrete
time models.
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is needed in order to prevent the model from implying an
ever-increasing variance.
Under certain conditions the repeated operation of
the process ultimately will lead to a unique limiting
*
distribution P which is independent of the initial dis¬
tribution P(0), that is P* = limP(t) = lim A^PCO) for all
t -> o° t ■+ 00
P(0). This limiting distribution is the steady state
* *
distribution that satisfies P =AP , ..(5)
and it can be determined by solving this equation.
Champernowne states that the process defined for an infinite
number of states by his model has the same property.
Through the operation of his process the income distribution
sjc
will tend to a limiting distribution P (s).
3|C
By analogy to (5) it follows from (2) that P (s) must
satisfy
P (s) = 2 p(u)P*(s-u). -.(6)
n = -k
9
Aitchison and Brown suggested that if the assumption
of discrete income ranges is replaced by one of continuity,
the resulting model is formally identical with the breakage
process of Kolmogoroff. For, if the probability that a
person with income in the interval (X , X + dX^ ) at time t
will have income in the interval (X. , X, M +dX.,-) by timet+1' t+1 t + 1 J
t + 1 is denoted by dG^CX^^, X^) , the basic postulate of the
law of proportionate effect asserts that dG^(Xt + ^,X ) depends
Xt + 1













X, dFt(Xt), ■ .(8)
where F (X^) is the distribution function of the income
variable X at time t. According to Aitchison and Brown
the equilibrium distribution tends to log normality.
II Shorrocks' Modification to Champernowne's Model.10
Shorrocks suggests a simple modification of Champer¬
nowne ' s model by presenting a second-order Markov model
where, we quote, "Individuals having been in income class
i at time t - 1 and now in class j at time t, have the same
transition rates regardless of their income history prior
to t -1." Let tie the probability of transition from
income class j to k in the period (t,t+l) given that income
class i was occupied at time t -1. As in Champernowne's
model p. does not change over time and depends only on
the size of the transitions j - i and k - j in the two periods
(t-l,t) and (t,t+l). Thus p.., = u^~d and the first-order' ' ijk k-j
Markov case considered by Champernowne corresponds to the
restriction that the u terms do not depend on the superscripts
If we let n^j(t) be the expected number of individuals
in class i at time t -1 and class j at time t, we will have
the following equations:
n ., (t + 1) = 2 n . . p. ., for all j ,k > 0 ..(9)jkv i ij ^ijk J' v '
2 nJk(t ♦!) - 2 n.j(t) 2 p.jk = 2 n. .(t) ..(10)
and 2 2 n ,(t +1) = 2 2 n (t) = N ..(11)
J k i j iJ
where N corresponds to the total number of income holders.
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* * *
Provided that n ., = 2 n. . p. for all j, k>0. njk i ij ^ijk J' ' jk
will be an equilibrium distribution of the process.
Shorrocks obtains the solution for the equilibrium distri¬
bution by successive substitutions.
Ill Rutherford's Model.11
Rutherford defines the logarithm of income as the
"power" of income. Then he assumes that all income earners
enter at the same age - in any given year there will be a
stream of new entrants - and that these adult earners may
receive both earned or unearned income. Rutherford also
assumes a normal distribution of "income power" of the new
entrants in the initial year. He mentions two reasons to
justify his assumption,
a) the distribution depends largely upon the distribution
of parental income powers, education and social
advantages, and
b) the distribution depends upon natural abilities.
According to Rutherford these factors are normally distri¬
buted or very nearly so, although it is not certain whether
they are so or not. Furthermore, he assumes that mortality
is unrelated to income power at least in the modern welfare
state and,by using the life tables of demographers, he
estimates the proportion of those new entrants who will
still be alive after any given period.
Let there be an entry of a^ individuals at time t,
with income power distributed normally around mean and
with variance . Then, assume that these new entrants are
subjected to a random walk. The shock system in year t +r
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will have a mean X,, and a variance of U2, and it willt+r t+r
be normal in character. The distribution of income power
at time T of the cohort which entered at time T - s will
then be normal with mean
y^ = _ + 2 Xrp _ r and variance
r =o
"2 = a'T-s + r=o UT"r "(12>
Rutherford assumes that the number of survivors at period
~kr
t + r of an entry of a^ at time t is given by a^ e =N(r),
where \ is the expectation of life at entry. So the mean-ft.
and the variance at time T for the cohort entering at time
T - s are :
2N(T - s) X =aT_se-Ks (MT_g) ♦ Jq XT_r)
SN(T - s)(X -X)2 = aT_s e Ks(a^,_s + 2 U2_r), ..(13)
r=o
s
where X = M,_ +2 XT-s _
r=o T-r
The total distribution at time T will be the integral of
the distributions of the cohorts entering at times T, T-l,
T-2 ... back to the earliest cohort from which there are
any survivors.
Rutherford makes the following simplifying equili¬
brium assumptions:
a) There is a constant rate of new entrants, distributed
with a constant mean and variance, that is a. = a,
= M, a2 = a2, where a, M, a2 are constants.
b) The shock system in all years has zero mean and a
constant variance, X^ = 0 and U2 = U2(constant).
Under these assumptions all cohorts, at all times, will
- 34 -
have the same mean, M. Consequently for the cohort
entering at time T-s, we have at time T the following
expressions for the mean and variance:
SN(T - s)X = M
2N(T - s) (X - M) 2 = ae~Ks (a2 +sU2). ..(14)
* 4
The moments of the total distribution can be
obtained by integrating each of the above relations over
the range of 0 < s < 00 . This gives, at time T, for any
cohorts
2 NX = M
TT2
2N(X -M)2 = g (a2 + g . .(15)
and the mean and variance of the total distribution are:
2 U2
y 1 = M, u2 = a k •
Finally, Rutherford determines the form of the distribution
from the moments. This synthesis corresponds to the Cram-
Charlier Type A series.
12
IV Mandelbrot's Stable Paretian Random Functions.
The stochastic processes introduced by Mandelbrot as
models for income distribution are based upon a family of
stable non-Gaussian random functions (Pareto-Levy law).
Mandelbrot presents a theory of the stationary stochastic
variation of income based upon the existence of certain
limits for sums of random functions on which the effect of
13
chance in time is multiplicative. In fact Parzen points
out that these processes are filtered Poisson processes.
* 4
The higher moments can be determined by following the same
procedure.
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A filtered Poisson process (X(t), -°° < t < °°} is
CO
defined by X(t) = 2 w(t-x.), where {x.} are the
j_ — _oo -*■
the times of occurrence of events of Poisson type with
intensity X, and
w(s) = C | s | 10 if s >0
uj(s) = -co(—s) if s <0, where C, b are positive constants
Furthermore we have b
The characteristic function of X(t) is given by
, , s. -k|u|a , 1 ,0(u) = e 1 1 , where a = ^ and
k = 2 aX Ca y a ^ ( 1 - cos y)dy. When 0 < a < 2
o
the above characteristic function is said to be a real
stable characteristic function. For a > 2, <f>(u) is not a
characteristic function, and in the case a=2, <j)(u) is the
characteristic function of a normal distribution.
V Simon's Model14
In Simon's model persons' incomes are regarded as
populations which grow according to a certain population
law, that is the number of births is in proportion to the
size of the population. Simon's model was initially
designed for the distribution of words in a text. It refers
to a section of the text which is continuously changed by
the addition of new words at one end and the dropping-out
of words at the other. The same model was applied by Simon
to the personal income distribution theory.
He considers the total annual income of all persons
above some specified minimum being k dollars, the segment
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of this sequence running from the m th to the (m+k)th
dollar is the income for the year beginning at time m.
An income in this case is a.population of i monetary units
growing according to the population law. New income-
earners enter the process with constant probability, while
some income-earners drop out with their whole income (at
the same average rate) so that the total segment of income
remains unchanged. Simon pictures the stream of income as
a sequence of dollars allocated probabilistically to the
recipients and he bases his procedure on the following
assumptions:
1) The probability that a dollar belonging to an income
class i is dropped as m increases is f(i).
2) To compensate for the number of dollars lost in this
way, additional dollars are allocated to the various
income classes, the probability that the additional
dollar will be allocated to a person with an annual
income of i dollars is proportional to (i +C)f(i),
where C is a positive small number which constrains
the proportion of the total income stream going to
persons of high income. f(i) is initially regarded
as the number of persons who possess i monetary units
but later it is treated as a probability.
3) There is a constant probability a that the additional
dollar will be assigned to new income-earners, that
is to persons very near the minimum income.
The process can be represented by the following
* 5
equations in which m is the amount of dollars which have
been added to - and simultaneously subtracted from - the
* 5
Alternatively it can be viewed as time.
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total annual income of all persons:
f (i ,m+l) = ('1k {i -1 + C)f (i - 1,m) - (i + C)f(i ,m) },
-p/ i -i x ak + C1(1, m 4-1) = —^
(1 - a)k r.,, ,irrt £o,m). . . (16)
A steady-state equilibrium of the above equations is
represented by
*
f (i) (1 - a)kk + C {i - 1 +C)f*(i - 1) - (i+C)f*(i)}
••(17)
Simon shows that the solution for this birth-and-death
process is the Yule distribution for large values of i.
VI The Galton-Markov Models.
The simple Markovian log-normal process sometimes
called the Galton-Markov, motivated the introduction of
various models into the personal income distribution theory.
The log-normal model is usually written as
Yt+i = Yt+Ut, ..(18)
where Y is the logarithm of income, t is time and U are
random variables independently and identically distributed
with finite variance. The model is Markovian, thus + ^
depends on the present value Y^ but not on the previous
values. On the additional assumptions that U are normal
and independent of Y ^, the distribution of Y will tend
towards normal after the process has been operating for
time sufficiently large.
Kalecki, mentioned earlier, and Thatcher15 replaced
the law of proportionate effect with the regression towards
the mean by assuming that
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Yt + 1 -Y = b(Yt - Y) + Ut -Ut, ..(19)
where the value of b controls the acceptance of any of the
two hypotheses.
16
Hart argues that, as far as the log-normal distri¬
bution of incomes is concerned, measures of static inequality
based on the variance a2 are insufficient, and they should
be supplemented by criteria related to dynamic properties
of the income distribution, particularly on b, the logarithmic
regression of a person's income at time t on that of for time
t -1, and on the residual variance.
17
Thatcher incorporated the Galton-Markov process and
Friedman's permanent income model into a single general model.
More particularly, he suggests that observed earnings Y^
are given by
Yt = yt + et, .-(20)
where y^ follows the Galton-Markov process and is a
transient component. Equation (20) may be written as
Yt = bYt-i + ut + et- --<21>
and if = 0 we obtain the Galton-Markov process, whereas
if b =1 and = 0 we obtain Friedman's model.
1 8
Finally Fase assumes a log-normal distribution for
the initial income of persons at the age when they start
their career, and relates age to the logarithm of income
according to the following equation
XT = XT-1 + £(T -T) + UT, . .(22)
where UT are random variables subject to the assumptions of
the Galton-Markov, and £(t - T) depends on age with £ >0 so
that this log income component increases up to a certain age
x and then it decreases at the same rate.
19
In a similar model Creedy regards the proportionate
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change in any individual's income as being the same as
that of the geometric mean income of his age group, apart
from a stochastic term which governs the extent of move¬
ments within the distribution. Symbolically we have
d log y. d log m
dF^ - dt^ + uit' •'(23)
where y^t is the income of individual i at age t, measured
in years from entry into the occupation or labour force, m




In an attempt to give mathematical formulation to
the neoclassical assumptions and to stress the importance
of the supply side of the labour market the human capital
models were introduced; one of the reasons for this devel¬
opment being the fact that they can easily comply with the
2 0
familiar econometric relationships. We quote from Mincer
"In stressing the role played by individual and family optimising
decisions in human capital investments, important aspects of income
determination are brought back within the main stream of economic
theory and within the power of its analytical and econometric tools".
According to the human capital theory a simple
earnings function for an individual is of the following form:
Y, = Y, + r. .C, . . where C, , is the dollar amount of net
t t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1
investment in period t-1, Y ^ are gross earnings including
investment expenditures and is "the rate of return on
this particular part of investment. The above expression
taken recursively gives
t-1
Y, = Y + r .2 C . , where Y is the initial earningst o j = o j ' o
capacity with no investments made and r is assumed to be the
same in each period.
The human capital approach treats the worker's choice
as an important factor, thus failing to recognise that lack
of mobility and the importance of promotional and on-the-job
training opportunities often constrain the worker's future
activities and earnings once his career origin has been
determined. In many cases workers have a strong preference
for permanent employment connections and for jobs yielding
a steady income.
2 1
Lebergott examined the distribution of incomes of
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males aged 25 -64 and he found that the distribution is
approximately normal. He attributed some skewness found
in the distribution to the existence of institutional
barriers, namely to the impact of credit rationing in
truncating a normal distribution. Lebergott's point was
that credit agencies deny credit to persons capable of
losing large sums of money while affording credit to those
who use it to acquire large incomes.
2 2
Lydall's model of the distribution of employment
incomes within an enterprise was based on the assumption
that the enterprise has the form of a pyramid with a
specified number of persons in each grade. Each supervisor
controls a fixed number of persons in the next lower grade
and his income is directly related to the aggregate income
of the persons whom he immediately supervises.
2 3
According to Roy all workers tend to be rewarded
in direct proportion to the output they produce. Each
individual output depends on a great number of different
uncorrelated factors which are considered to act together in
amultiplicative way. By applying the Central Limit Theorem
he concluded that the workers' output related to any commodity
and, consequently, the workers' income is distributed log-
normally.
2 4
Mayer emphasized the correlation between a man's
ability and his scale of operation measured, for example, in
units produced. He defined ability as the probability of
completing a given task successfully. His basic conclusion
was that the value of one unit of a man's output follows the
same distribution as his ability but on a different scale.
Since the scale of operation is correlated with ability the
distribution of the value of a man's output will have more
- 42 -
positive skewness or less negative skewness than the dis¬
tribution of ability. Therefore, if we assume that ability
is normally distributed the earnings will follow the log-
normal distribution.
2 5
Stiglitz attributed some of the earnings inequality
to screening which is defined as the identification of
qualities characterizing each individual. He argued that
screening information has productivity returns but tends
to increase inequality since an individual being labelled
as more productive gets a higher wage, partly at the expense
of others. Thus income distribution in economies character¬
ized by imperfect information with respect to the qualities
of individuals greatly differ from the one in economies with
perfect information.
2 Q
Finally Friedman saw the satisfaction of men's
tastes and preferences as a determinant of inequality in the
personal income distribution. He assumed that alternatives
open to an individual differ in the probability distribution
of income they promise, and that individuals are free to
choose among alternatives involving risk as if they knew
the probability distribution of income attached to each
alternative. The number of alternatives is limited by the
additional assumption that individuals seek to maximize the
expected value of their utility function which is an increas¬
ing function of income.
- 43 -
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CHAPTER 3: "THE INTERNAL LABOUR MARKETS"
According to Cain1 labour economics has been a
controversial field within economics since it covers
such topics as income distribution, unions, unemployment
and discrimination. The importance of labour economics
is neither denied nor questioned by economists, and it is
a well established fact that the neoclassical school
played the dominant role in the field; a role that is
based on the two familiar neoclassical assumptions, namely
the profit maximizing behaviour of employers and the
utility maximization of workers. In the 1960s, however, a
new approach was developed challenging the conventional
neoclassical theory, an approach that has been presented
under various names, and consists of theories allied in
purpose but different in idealogical origin. The conceptual
and empirical unit of the new approach is the segmented
labour market and the names given to it, cited by Cain, are
the following: radical, dual, tripartite, stratified,
hierarchical, and job competition.
The most important feature of the segmented labour
market theories is the existence of non-competing groups
and particularly the dichotomy between primary and secondary
sectors in the labour market. Our basic aim in this chapter
will be to discuss the characteristics and functioning of
the internal labour market, the basic structural unit of the
primary sector, and also to put forward the theoretical
foundations of a mathematical formulation for the growth and
distribution of labour incomes in the above market.
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A. The Description of the Internal Market.
Generally speaking, the internal labour market
reflects the existing internal relations of modern bureau¬
cratic corporations and it may be defined as an administra¬
tive unit within which the market functions of pricing,
allocating and training labour are performed. These func¬
tions are determined by a set of administrative rules and
procedures which are rigid in the face of the conventional
economic variables, at least on a short-run basis. This
set of institutional or administrative rules determining
the internal structure of the market and its functions
define, in particular, the ports of entry into the market,
the relations between jobs and the privileges which accrue
to workers within the market.
Internal markets form the major part of the primary
sector - a well-known concept in the dual labour market
2
literature - where, according to Doeringer and Piore,
there are a great number of good job opportunities in large
corporations, stable employment relations, a high probabil¬
ity of promotion and good working conditions.
3
More recently Piore broadened the dual labour market
hypothesis by dividing the primary sector into an upper
tier and a lower one. The upper tier consists of profes¬
sional and managerial jobs and, although there is still an
internalized code of behaviour, there are no set of work
rules and formal administrative procedures which characterize
lower-tier employment relations. Educational requirements
in the upper tier are an essential requisite for employment,
jobs are highly remunerated and there are more promotion
opportunities and greater status; the individual attributes
considered to be important in the upper tier are general
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skills such as initiative and creativity. From a
sociological point of view, Piore links the upper tier
to the middle class subculture and the lower tier to the
working class one.
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B. The Allocative Structure of the Internal Market.
A proper analysis of the allocative structure of
the internal market has been made by the dual market
theorists, the most prominent among the proponents of
the segmented labour market theory. The analysis is
based upon three factors:
a) The degree of openness to the external labour market
which depends upon the number of ports of entry and
the restrictiveness of the criteria for entry. A
closed internal market is one where all jobs are
filled internally, while in an open one vacancies in
all job classifications are filled directly from the
external labour market. In the latter case hiring
responds to external market conditions in the way
hypothesized by the conventional economic theory but
the allocation of work assignments, the determination
of wages and the rationing of jobs are all governed
by administrative rules that are not totally respon¬
sive to the market forces. We must note, however,
that external allocations to higher grades rarely take
place, employees normally entering the lowest grade
and being promoted internally. Open internal markets
mainly exist in the secondary sector, and especially
* 1
in the case of self-employed persons. Nevertheless,
external allocations, when they occur, tend to be
restricted to firms or institutions within a certain
industry; they seldom take place across them. There¬
fore the broader and more general the organizational
structure being considered the smaller the probability
* 1
See table at the end of the Chapter.
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of an external allocation.
4
Bosanquet and Doeringer in discussing the existence
of dual labour market in Great Britain divided internal
labour markets into structured and open ones on the
basis of enterprise-specific training, the term
"structured" being equivalent to the term "closed".
Firms in open internal markets allocate most jobs
externally and provide few opportunities for on-the-job
training and promotion. On the other hand, enterprises
in structured internal markets hire workers into a
limited number of entry jobs, and then promotions take
place internally with emphasis given to specific train¬
ing. Whenever firms invest heavily in specific training
they rely upon internal promotion ladders and upon the
minimization of labour turnover. If the job structure
within a firm requires few specific skills, then most
of the jobs will be filled from the external labour
market, and the employer is generally indifferent to
turnover. The authors conclude that structured internal
markets are found mainly in the primary sector, while
the open ones exist in the secondary sector of the market.
The presence of enterprise-specific training encourages
market duality not only on the demand side of the market
but also on the supply one,since workers in the primary
sector have access to opportunities for specific on-the-
job training that reward stable employment relations.
Habits and traits developed by workers in both sectors
tend to reinforce the polarization (the segmentation) of
the labour market.
The geographical and occupational scope-size of the
internal market define mobility clusters, that is group-
ings of jobs within which patterns of mobility are
explicit. Jobs in each mobility cluster share one
or more of the following elements: related skills
and work experience, similar level of job content,
a common departmental organization and a single focus
or work. Mobility clusters have a vertical and
horizontal dimension; the former is defined by the
range of skill content of the jobs within the cluster,
while the latter measures the number, degree of
specialization and, perhaps, diversity of the jobs
at any level of skill.
5
Birnbaum presented a similar classification by
arranging jobs in skill families on the basis of
skill relationships. In each skill family job tasks
differ according to the level of skill each involves
(position of an imaginary learning curve), and also
jobs differ in the range of skill families they encom¬
pass .
There is a set of rules determining the priorities
in which workers will be distributed among the jobs
within a mobility cluster. These rules are functions
of ability, seniority and frequency of work. Needless
to say that there is a unity and coherence in the
rules governing the internal allocation of labour so
that a change in any one dimension will require adjust¬
ment along other dimensions as well.
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C. The Generation and the Origins of Internal Markets.
The prevalent view among segmented labour market
economists is that the intensification of hierarchial
control and the internal specialisation of labour brought
about the creation of job ladders, particular entry-level
jobs and promotion policies, A more detailed analysis of
the emergence of internal markets, however, requires an
outline of the three main hypotheses presented so far
*2
regarding the generation of these markets.
First the dual market theorists consider technology
and custom as the two main factors that initiated internal
labour markets. There are specific skills uniquely attached
to certain job classifications in a firm, and due to this
skill specialization a very small number of individuals
learn a particular skill at a given time in the process of
production. Therefore, on-the-job training is far more
essential than general training acquired by education, and
since labour is considered to be a quasi-fixed factor of
production, employers face increasing turnover costs. The
other crucial factor involved in the generation of internal
markets is custom and practice which accounts for the rigidity
of the prevailing administrative rules and guarantees stability
for both employer and the workforce. Customary practice
ensures the transition from the competitive market to the
internal one provided that costs can be reduced; the costs
being considered are usually the value of an internal market
to the labour force (the trade-off between present and future
income security), the turnover costs and the technical
efficiencies of the internal market in the recruitment, screen¬
ing and training of labour.
* 2
None of these hypotheses has been adequately substantiated.
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Wachter takes a similar approach within the frame¬
work of the neoclassical theory by arguing that efficiency
and productivity play the only important role in the
creation of internal markets. As in the dual market
theory, he bases his argument on the existence of idiosyn¬
cratic jobs and the technology of on-the-job training, but
he stresses the efficiency orientation of firms in internal
markets. A modern bureaucratic corporation has to minimize
bargaining and turnover costs, and also to ensure that
investments of idiosyncratic types, a potential source of
bilateral bargaining for jobs, are undertaken without the
risk of exploitation by either the unions or other firms.
Wachter lists three functions of the promotion ladder in an
efficient internal market - namely, rewarding meritorious
performance and reducing turnover, the acquisition by workers
of specific training for higher-level jobs in the firm and
the provision of a screening mechanism within the firm. So
far as the last function is concerned the author points out
that firms possess imperfect information with regard to
screening and, although schooling and educational credentials
play some part in providing useful information, in a technology
that requires specific and on-the-job training the promotion
ladder may be the most efficient apparatus for collecting and
analyzing data on individual performance. 3
* 3
7
Reder claims that a substantial part of human capital investment
takes the form of employer knowledge of employee capabilities,
behavioural traits or suitability for promotion and of specific
training at any stage of the promotion ladder. Therefore the
greater costs of specific training, hiring and screening induce
employers to favour promotion from within rather than hiring
outsiders.
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Finally the radical school explains the appearance
of internal markets within a more general framework by
attributing it to the institutional arrangements governing
g
production. Edwards argues that there are two systems of
control:
a) simple hierarchy where the control is openly,
arbitrarily and personally exercised by the capitalist,
and
b) Bureaucratic control which is a more sophisticated,
impersonal and institutionalized means of exercising
power.
These two systems of control are related to the social
relations of production in the firm.
In the early era of monopoly capitalism big corpora¬
tions tried to gain control over the risky elements of
their environment, particularly the labour force, by inter¬
nalizing them; thus, as large firms moved from simple
hierarchy to bureaucratic control, they initiated the
creation of internal markets. The imposition of bureau¬
cratic control altered the power relations of hierarchical
authority by rendering them invisible and embedding them
in the firm's structure. Jobs became thoroughly differ¬
entiated by their organizational and technical aspects,
and the supervisor is seen as a monitor and evaluator of
the employee's performance. According to the radical
theorists, the basic outcome of this process is that the
workforce became less hostile to an impersonal and massive
organization, while behaviour characteristics associated
with burearcratic control - such as propensity to follow
the rules, habits of predictability, dependability and
loyalty to the firm - became essential.
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Bureaucratic control also encourages the develop¬
ment of employment stability by creating career ladders
and instituting rewards or promotions for tenure and
seniority within the firm. Rewarding the workers who
demonstrated stability, both in their everyday behaviour
at the job, and in the length of time they stayed at a
job, is seen by the radical theorists as the main feature
of the operation of internal labour markets.
In retrospect dual theory sees technology as the main
determinant of the development of internal markets which,
under certain constraints, are efficient systems of work
organization. On the other hand, radical theory considers
internal markets as systems with which capitalists maximize
their control over the labour force, since homogeneity (non-
segmentation) of the labour force would strengthen workers'
resistance to ruling class domination of the production
process. In both theories Trade Unions play a marginal
9
role; this particular point has been raised by Rubery
who argues that workers can establish and maintain a bargain¬
ing position through the development of a structured labour
force, and that in both dual and radical theories the devel¬
opment of the structure has been viewed from only one per¬
spective, through the motivations and actions of capitalists,
the role of worker organization having been completely
neglected in the process.
Rubery relies upon Braverman's thesis10 that the period
of monopoly capitalism has been characterized by a progressive
reduction in skills for the mass of workers; more particu¬
larly the greater amount of scientific knowledge embodied
in the labour processes has brought about a polarization of
skills in the sense that the mass of workers have lost craft
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and traditional abilities, and they have been allienated
or lost control over the sophisticated labour processes.
Braverman's attack is two-fold, first he criticizes
the statistical classification of occupations in the U.S.
with special reference to the category of semi-skilled
workers who, due to some connection with machinery, have
been arbitrarily called semi-skilled without possessing any
real training or ability and have increasingly grown in
numbers. Therefore there is a continuous redistribution of
employment to the occupations where productivity increases
have been lowest, and a progressive reduction in divisions
within the mass of the labour force, based on a levelling
down of the skilled workers.
His second criticism is addressed to the lengthening
of the average educational period; contrary to the human
capital approach where an increase in the standards of
education and in the general productivity level of workers
causes a levelling-up of skills, Braverman argues that the
functions of education are primarily to create obedient and
disciplined citizens who can conform, and adjust to the
urban environment, to provide socialization to the city life
and to decrease the recognised level of unemployment. He
concludes that education has been losing its connection
with the job or occupational requirements, and he implicitly
questions the importance of job-specific skills in the
monopoly capitalism era, thus undermining the dual market
theory.
Rubery, on the other hand, suggests that the inter¬
nalization of the labour market was brought about by the
workers' success in regaining some of the control lost
through the destruction of the craft system rather than by
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capitalists' efforts to increase their control over the
labour force. Workers, in order to safeguard themselves
from the threat of substitution - due to the introduction
of new technology - and competition, try to differentiate
themselves from potential competitors, thus depending upon
various systems of labour segmentation. The development
of monopoly capitalism continually disrupts industrial
organization and displaces labour as skills become redundant.
The movement of capitalism from old into new areas destroys
existing jobs and skills, the serious wide-effect being the




D. The Dynamic Analysis and the Evolution of the Structure
of Internal Markets.
It seems to us that internal labour markets, regard¬
less of their origin, are uniquely related to the advanced
* it
capitalist era. Braverman's argument that the process
of development deskills the working-force and prevents the
creation of on-the-job specific skills suffers from three
serious shortcomings. First, as Rubery pointed out, he
completely ignores the resistance of the labour force within
a dynamic framework of analysis and, in particular, the
Trade Unions role in the determination of the social
relations of production. Secondly, by being preoccupied
with craft expertise, he ignores the fact that specific
forms of skill or expertise may be tolerated by capitalists,
provided that these skills do not present major problems to
the expansion (or accumulation) of capital. During periods
of technical innovation technological change creates new
skills or increases the productivity of existing ones, thus
rendering these skills essential to the production process;
the computer and electronics industry is a well-known example.
* 4.
Some empirical evidence on the existence of internal markets has
been collected by Doeringer and Piore; the authors do not present
their evidence, but they caution the reader against the problems
of fragmentation, sampling and statistical design related to the
data.
Bosanquet and Doeringer point out that there is market duality in
Great Britain, but due to apprenticeship tradition in the British
industry, and the strength of craft unionism internal markets are
not as structured as in the U.S.A. Their conclusions are mainly
based on their own survey and on the work by D.I. Mackay et al.,
Labour Markets under Different Employment Conditions, Glasgow
University, Social and Economic Studies, No.22 London 1971.
Finally, Alexander11 provides some empirical evidence on the ex¬
istence of manorial (closed), guild and unstructured internal
markets, employee mobility being his classification criterion.
He derives his data from the Social Security one percent work
history file in the U.S.A.
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Thirdly, Braverman disregards the very nature of
internal markets with their permanent employment relations
and their committed labour force. Hierarchical job ladders
and permanent employment connections not only foster on-the-
job training programmes, but they also enable the workers to
familiarize themselves with the existing production process
in the firm and, consequently, to disrupt it by collective
action.
The evolution of the internal market structure is
determined by both the demand and the supply side of the
market, the interaction between these two forces being too
complicated to be analyzed in detail. From a static point
of view the basic determinants of the structure are the
technology of production and the work methods within a firm
set by entrepreneurs and Trade Unions. From a dynamic point
of view, on the demand side, technological change and
qualitative and quantitative shifts in demand for the product
of the firm can seriously alter the structure of the internal
market by affecting the job content, the proportion of
specialized jobs and the employment opportunities within the
plant or the firm. On the supply side, the pertinent factors
are custom, tradition, Trade Union pressure and the avail¬
ability of various types and qualities of labour in the
external labour market.
In many cases, the supply forces tend to restrain the
efficient development of the market structure; the rigidity
of custom and practise and the workers' interest in the market
as a means of enhancing job security and advancement act as
constraints upon the employers' initiative to choose the
structure that minimizes costs. The latter constraint can
take any of the following forms:
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a) Control of the experienced workforce over the
supply of skilled labour.
b) Worker expectations regarding the rules affecting
the relationship between present and future incomes
within the internal market.
c) Restrictions upon entry, that is a rigid set of
entry rules that provides job security and insulates
workers from external competition.
d) Dependence of promotion and allocative rules on
seniority which also insulates workers from external
competitors.
e) Rationing of jobs within the market in order to
prevent a change in the rules that could bring about
conflict between various groups of workers.
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E. The Wage Structure of the Internal Market.
12
Doeringer and Piore recognize three dimensions
of the internal wage structure:
a) The plant wage level relative to other plants (or
firms) in the community, or the weighted average of
plant wage wates.
b) The vertical differentiation of the wage structure
which refers to differences in wage rates among
individuals holding different jobs (skill grades).
c) The horizontal differentiation which refers to
differences in wage rates among individuals holding
the same job.
According to the authors, the formal instruments of
wage administration are job evaluation schemes, community
wage surveys and engineered production standards. Job
evaluation is a procedure for ranking jobs based on a con¬
sistent set of weighted job characteristics and worker
traits. Jobs are groups in labour grades and a certain
wage rate is assigned to each grade, thus forming a grade
hierarchy. One main purpose of job evaluation is to make
the wage rates paid to employees wholly dependent upon the
jobs they hold, so that personal favouritism can be either
eliminated or, at least, minimized.
By a community wage survey the firm appraises the
appropriateness of its wage structure with respect to its
major competitors for labour, identifies a target wage
structure, and tries to adjust its own structure to the
target one.
Finally, the engineered production standards are
related to horizontal differentiation; by merit rating
and incentive systems employers evaluate and reward good
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individual performance at a single job grade. Among
these instruments the most important one is the job
evaluation scheme.
The above described instruments of wage determina¬
tion in the internal market reflect stable market condi¬
tions and usually adjust to any market change. One would
expect, however, a divergence or conflict between labour
market evaluation of jobs and internal job evaluation but,
13
as Reder pointed out, these conflicts are not very
frequent because market considerations enter indirectly
the internal job evaluation process by:
a) The existing similarity of qualities that add to
the value of a job in both the labour market and
the job evaluation scheme.
b) The prevailing tendency to choose the weights attached
to certain job factors in the internal evaluation pro¬
cess so as to yield comparatively high point values
for those types of workers to whom the firm must pay
relatively high wages, as a condition of securing and
retaining their services.
Employers foster a formalized wage setting in order
to alleviate Trade Union pressure and to advance intrafirm
efficiency. The first point is related to the firm's
efforts to justify their wage policies to Trade Union
representatives and to equity-conscious workers for the
purpose of reducing turnover, developing company loyalty
and improving employee morale.
So far as intrafirm efficiency is concerned, the
internal wage structure, apart from the entry job the wage
rate of which is determined by competitive market forces,
attaches wage increases to promotions in order to make them
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desirable, thus encouraging employees to absorb more
training and establishing authority relations within
the firm.
A more precise and broader classification of
14
internal wage rates was presented by Dunlop who intro¬
duced the concepts of job cluster and wage contour, the
central points where the wage-making forces are concentrated.
A job cluster is defined as a stable group of job classifi¬
cations or work assignments within a firm linked together
by technology, social custom and the administrative organi¬
zation of the production process. The jobs within the
cluster have common wage-making characteristics and the wage
rates are closely related.
Dunlop argues that any internal wage structure is
divided into groups of job clusters. A wage contour is
defined as a stable group of wage-determining units (firms
or plants) which are linked together by similarity of product
markets, resort to similar sources for a labour force,
common labour market organization and common wage-making
characteristics. Therefore a wage contour has three dimen¬
sions :
a) Particular job clusters.
b) An industrial sector, and
c) Geographical location.
We must note, however, that a wage contour should not be
identified with an industry, it is rather confined to
certain ranges of skill, occupations, or job clusters of
the constituent firms.
In a wage contour the wage rates are mainly determined
by the key firm or firms, a key firm being the largest one,
the price-leader, or the one with labour-relations leadership.
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The wage-making process is internally concentrated on
the key rates in the job clusters, these rates constituting
the focal points for wage-setting forces among firms within
the contour. In other words, the key wage rates in the job
clusters are the channels of impact between the exterior
developments (in the contour) and the interior rate struc¬
ture of the firm.
In the short run, the anatomy of the wage structure
of an internal market is determined by the level of tech¬
nology, the administrative arrangements of firms, competitive
patterns in product markets and the sources of labour supply.
In the long run the crucial factors are the rate and pattern
of industrialization, and changes in the supply of labour.
One of the effects of industrial growth on large firms was
the progressive elimination of personalized wages that
existed in the early stages of industrial development, and
the creation of explicit wage rates for defined occupations
and jobs. The emergence of an explicit wage scale is linked
to the structuring of the labour force by skill or perform¬
ance, and it does not lend itself to a satisfying explanation
of internal wage differentials by a simple demand and supply
approach. The integrated production process creates a wide
but variable area of joint demand for labour, while the
better paying jobs appear at any given time to be rationed;
therefore one job cannot be regarded as independent of
related jobs, neither from the demand side nor from the
supply one.
Finally, the process of economic development creates
a hierarchy of wage rates on a national level exterior to
an enterprise. This national wage structure may be influenced
either by explicit rules or by the market forces. A greater
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degree of interdependence in the internal wage structure
of a firm is likely to emerge among firms in the same or
closely allied product markets in a particular locality.
This uniformity may spread to firms in more distant
localities in the same product grouping or contour.
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F. Wage Determination in Closed Internal Markets.
Do Neoclassical Theories Provide an Answer?
The assumptions implicitly made in the neoclassical
wage theory are not valid in the wage determination of
the internal labour market, the existence of fixed employ¬
ment costs - regarding recruitment, screening and training
- and the permanence of employment relations prevent the
wage rate from being equal to the worker's marginal product.
15
Doeringer and Piore argue that "in sum, the forces which
in neoclassical theory yield a determinate wage establish,
in the internal market, only a series of constraints. The
equality between the marginal product of labour and the
wage of a job postulated by competitive economic theory is
reduced to an equality between the discounted present value
of expected cost and productivity streams calculated over
the distribution of expected employment tenure for various
groups within the enterprise."
In short, dual theorists point out that the customary
and formal wage administrative procedures, aiming to avoid
bargaining and fixed labour costs inherent in internal
markets, dictate certain solutions to the wage-setting
problem; this solution, however, is achieved through a
series of constraints, the most important ones being:
a) The internal allocative administrative rules which
define the shape of the internal mobility clusters.
b) The rules related to efficiencies in the recruitment,
screening and training.
c) Custom.
d) The relationship between earnings and social status.
e) The individual utility functions.
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Wachter argues that there is no infinite number
of equilibrium internal wage structures but, contrary to
the dual theory, management selects the wage structure
that maximizes intrafirm efficiency.
17
According to Birnbaum earnings inequality may
arise partly because differential experience in various
jobs and job ladders offers individuals different earning
opportunities for developing cognitive task skills, and
partly because different job ladders change certain person¬
ality traits such as reliability, responsiveness to authority
and discipline. In the internal markets, the earnings of
those workers who have a strong preference for permanent
employment relations and for jobs yielding a steady income
are determined by their career origin and the promotional or
on-the-job training opportunities attached to it, the much
celebrated worker choice playing a marginal part in the long
run.
18
Reder suggests that promotional ladders are
institutional devices that serve as a mutual insurance
scheme for both the firm and its employees. Employers seek
to hedge hiring risks by promoting from within, while
employees try to avoid risks related to their mathematical
expectation of earnings during their lifetime. Furthermore,
the author points out that the existence of Trade Unions
and the external pressure of labour markets constrain the
internal wage policies of the firms: we quote.- "in short,
the very imperfect attempts at mutual insurance represented
by a policy of promotion from within enormously complicate
the relation between the value of the current marginal
contribution of a productive agent and its reward, and alter
the distribution of earnings in a variety of ways."
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The last shortcoming of neoclassical theories
vis-a-vis wage determination in closed internal markets
is their weakness to explain the fact that the large
monopolistic firms, of which internal markets are mainly-
composed, pay higher wages to their employees than the
* 5
ones dictated by the competitive market. These firms
being more vulnerable to the press seek to buy public
approval and to stand well in public opinion. A large
corporation, in addition, puts more emphasis on dependable
and regimented workers, therefore it pays higher wages in
order to avoid erratic performance on-the-job, excessive
absenteeism, and to keep the "good will" of its employees.
Finally, large corporations pay higher wages in order to
dissuade workers from unionizing or, if strong unions do
exist, to have friendly relations with them, thus main¬
taining their dependable work-force. Needless to say that
large monopolistic firms have the potential to pass the
higher wages on to the consumers.
Concluding, we note that the concept of the learning
curve, the role of groups in the formation of individual
preferences, custom and practise, Trade Unions, and the firm's
internal and external status or relations are of critical
importance to the distribution and growth of earnings in
closed internal markets.
*5 19
Weiss found that concentrated industries pay high incomes for
certain occupations, although the fact that these industries hire
high quality labour may account for the evidence.
20
Dalton and Ford recently found that even if we correct for the
high quality of labour factor, there is still a positive relation¬
ship between concentration and high level of wages.
21
Masters presents empirical support to the hypothesis that plant




Employment Distribution by Type of Internal Labour
Market, 1965. (U.S.A)





Enterprise type. 54. 4
Military services. 3.2
Workers in public enterprises. 11. 8
Workers in institutions (includes
hospitals, universities,
museumns, etc.) 2.9
Union workers in large enterprises. 11. 8
Non-union workers under industrial
agreements. 1.3
Workers outside the bargaining unit
in large enterprises. 7.0
Workers in large non-union
enterprises. 7. 0
Workers in small enterprises. 27. 0
Craft type.








offices and laboratories. 1.6
Workers performing odd jobs, service
and repair work. .9
TOTAL 100. 0
This table appears on page 42 of "Internal Labor
Markets and Manpower Analysis" by Doeringer P. and Piore M.
and it is derived from O.W.Phelps, "Introduction to Labor
Economics, New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1967.
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CHAPTER 4: "STOCHASTIC MODELS AND POINT PROCESSES'.'
We would like to remark that this chapter is not a
contribution to the existing mathematical theory but it is
intended to be a brief introduction to the theory of point
processes and a guide to the non-mathematical reader.
A. Definition of a Stochastic Process.
Cox and Miller1 define a stochastic process as a
system which develops in time or space according to proba-
bilitistic laws, time being the most common parameter of
2
the process. Massy et al emphasize the ex ante probabilistic
structure of the stochastic models, we quote, "As we understand
current terminology, a stochastic model is a model in which the proba¬
bility components are built in at the outset rather than being added
ex post facto to accommodate discrepancies between predicted and actual
results. That is, the probabilistic components form an important part
of the basic structure of the stochastic model."
There have been a lot of criticisms related to the
application of stochastic models into economics. The main
criticism has been directed at the economic content of the
* 1
models. Many economists argue that the element of chance
has become a substitute for economic theory, thus questioning
or even rejecting the relevance of stochastic models as
explanations of size distributions. Although the random
elements are inherent in both the conditions and the assump¬
tions under which the economic system has to function the
stochastic models so far presented incorporate few of the
familiar economic variables, and consequently these models
set up to explain size distributions lack in economic content;
* 1 3 4
See, for instance, Lydall and Sahota.
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we quote from Shorrocks5 "to some extent the problem is one
of defining suitable stochastic analogues of deterministic
theories, a problem which is aggravated when state variables,
such as wealth classes, do not correspond to those used in
deterministic models".
Let us try to clarify a basic misunderstanding that
prevails among economists as far as the idea of randomness
is concerned. It is a well-known fact in the literature
that mathematical models are either deterministic or prob¬
abilistic (stochastic models falling under the latter
category). In deterministic models we consider mathemati¬
cal variables and the effect of any change in the system
can be predicted with certainty. On the other hand, when¬
ever the system is not fully specified or because of the
unpredictable character of the human behaviour (and this
is the case in economics) there is a certain uncertainty
incorporated in any prediction or outcome, and so in this
case we introduce random variables with probability distri¬
butions assigned to them. The introduction of random
variables though does not necessarily mean that mere chance
plays the important role in the system as many economists
still believe. Mere chance or randomness, being the proper
term for it, operates in a particular class of stochastic
processes and it is directly related to the Markovian
property and the lack of memory of the geometric and the
negative exponential distributions, as we will explain later.
Bartholomew6 mentions a more general objection that it
is often raised to the application of stochastic models in
the social sciences. The argument that by allowing probabil¬
ity laws to govern human relations we deprive human beings
of freedom of choice is not theoretically valid and, accord¬
ing to the author, it rests on a misunderstanding of the
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nature of probability theory in model building; since
human beings are free-decision makers, their behaviour is
unpredictable and, therefore a probabilistic model is
more appropriate to be applied, while a deterministic
one would constrain human behaviour along a predeter¬
mined path. Bartholomew also makes a distinction
between "explanatory" models and "black-box" ones. He
defines the former as the ones that aim to explain the
mechanism which governs the relationship between the
input and the output variables of a certain system,
while the latter merely state the relationship, a model
of the regression type being a typical example.
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B. The homogeneity Assumption and the Markovian Property.
Stochastic processes are basically divided according
to two criteria, the assumption of homogeneity and the
Markovian property, which have been the main obstacles to
the introduction of economic theory into the stochastic
models so far presented. Suppose we have a Markov process
with discrete states in continuous time and let X(t)
denote the state occupied at time t. The process is in
principle defined when we have a set of functions (transi¬
tion probability functions) p _(t) with the interpretation:
p..(t) = probab {X(t +u) = j|X(u) = i} and the processt J
is time-homogeneous if the probability functions are
independent of u. The homogeneity assumption has enabled
economists to make extensive use of the properties of
ergodic processes and equilibrium aspects of the systems;
but if the parameters of the system are functions of
economic variables, generally time-dependent, the time-
homogeneous models cannot by nature explain the size dis¬
tributions of income or wealth.
7
Shorrocks criticized the time-homogeneous models
analytically and be introduced a non-homogeneous birth
and death process with "immigration" in order to explain
the size distribution of wealth, the transition intensities
of the process being dependent upon the individual's age t.
Although representing the process parameters as
functions of time-dependent economic variables seems to be
a formidable task, it does not give a satisfactory answer
g
to the objections raised so far; as Quandt in his model
of the size distribution of firms points out, we quote,
"what guarantee or what reason for belief does one have
that the transition matrix in one industry will be the
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same, or nearly the same as in another? In general one
cannot assume the inter-industry stability of transition
matrices. If one is willing to hypothesize, contrary to
what some have held, that cost and demand functions have
something to do with the manner in which industries
develop, one may arrive at a model of industry develop¬
ment in which transition matrices depend on the following
factors:
1) The nature of the short-run cost function
2) The nature of the long-run cost function
3) The nature of oligopolistic arrangements - or the
absence thereof - in a given industry ....
4) The general configuration of competing products,
changes in relative technology, and changes in
relative demands
But it is not even plausible to suggest that only the values
of certain parameters will be different; in all likelihood
the nature of the stochastic process itself will differ
from case to case. Accordingly it would be surprising if
the same distribution (with different estimated values for
the parameters) were to fit all cases".
Q
Ruggles emphasizes the fact that a wide range of
institutional, historical and sociological factors are
directly related to the overall distribution of incomes,
while Shorrocks 10 says the following, "The Markov property
implies that individuals with the same income will have
identical predictions for the future, regardless of whether
in the recent past their income has been increasing or
falling, and it denies the possibility of serial correlation
in the growth rates for different periods. This is
incompatible with Friedman's distiction between permanent
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and transitory income which predicts a negative
correlation between growth rates of income".
Consequently, so far as the application of stochastic
processes into economics is concerned it seems that the
Markovian property plays an important role.
The Markovian property can be described as follows:
suppose we have a discrete time stochastic process
{X(t),t =0,1,2,...}or a continuous parameter one{X(t),tX)},
we call the process Markovian if, for any set of n time
points ti <t2 <... < t > the conditional distribution of
X(tn), for given values of X(ti), X(t2), ... X(tn_^),
depends on X(tn ), the most recent known value. In other
words prob .{X(t )<x IX(11 ) = x j, ... X(t ..) =x - } =*
n n1 ' n-1 n-1
prob. {X(t ) <x |X(t . ) = x } and so the present of the^ v ny n1 v n-1 n-i ^
process determines its future, the past being of no
importance. However, we can examine the property of the
same process not by studying the random variable X(t)
but by considering the points of time where transitions
occur; in order to examine the latter approach we have to
introduce a particular class of stochastic processes, the
point processes.
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C. Point Processes and Their Applications.
* 2
Point or counting processes are a general type
of non-Markovian process. In a point process there are
certain events which possess the regenerative quality,
that is once a regenerative point has been reached, the
whole development preceding and leading up to this point
( or event ) is of no further consequence for the following
process. The regenerative event embodies the whole past,
that is any information relevant for the further develop¬
ment of the process. More precisely, suppose that a process
{X(t), t>0} is such that for some particular time T and
for all t >T the conditional probability distribution of
X(t), given X(T), is equal to the conditional probability
distribution of X(t), given X(x), for all x <T, the point
T or the event by which it can be identified is called a
regeneration point for the process and any process that has
such points is called a counting or point process. Markov
processes are those in which every point along the time-axis
has the regenerative quality, thus a point process being a
generalization of the Markov one.
A very important category of point processes is the
well-known renewal process; an integer-valued process
(n(t), t >0} corresponding to a series of points or events
distributed on the interval (0,t) is called a renewal process
if the inter-arrival times xi, x2, ... between successive
events are independent identically distributed positive
random variables. The proper random variable n(t) is the
number of renewals or events during the interval (0,t), and
it has finite moments of all orders.
Let Sn be the waiting time to the nth event, that
is the time it takes for n events to occur. The successive
^"2 ' 11
As Farzen refers to them.
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inter-arrival times are defined as follows:
xi is the time from zero to the first event and for i >1,
t. is the time from the (i-l)st to the ith event.
1
Therefore S = ti+t2+... t for n>l. There is a basic
n n
relation between a point process (n(t), t >0} and the
corresponding sequence of waiting times {S }. For t >0
n(t) = max {n IS <t}, or n(t)<n if and only if S >tn J n+1
n = 1, 2, ... It follows that n(t) = n if and only if
S <t and S ,, >t.n n+1
The Markovian property is uniquely related to a
particular renewal process, the Poisson process. Let
n(t, t +At) denote the number of events in the interval
(t, t +At). Suppose that, for some positive constant p,
as At + 0, we have:
prob.{n(t, t+At) = 0} = l-p(At)+0(At), (1)
the last term implying that the probability of more than
one events occurring simultaneously is zero in the interval
At.
Also prob. {n(t, t +At) = 1} = p(At) +0(At), (2)
therefore n(t, t+At) is completely independent of occurr¬
ences in the interval (0,t ]. We call this stochastic
series of events a Poisson process of rate p. Let us now
consider a new time origin at t , which may be a point at
which an event has just occurred, or any fixed point. Let
t + z be the time of the first event after t , and let us
o o'
calculate the probability distribution of the random
variable z. If P(x) = prob. (z>x) it follows that
P(x+Ax) = prob.(z>x) times the prob. {no event occurring in
(t +x, t +x+Ax)| z>x} (3)o ' o 1
Equation (3) holds for any renewal process but a special
feature of the Poisson process that describes the Markovian
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property is that the conditional probability in (3)
is not affected by the condition z >x, which refers to
what happens at or before t +x. Therefore all the
properties of the Poisson process referring to its future
behaviour, after t , are independent of what happens at
or before t . In this case we can replace the conditional
o
probability in (3) with the unconditional one in (1)
so that (3) becomes
P(x+Ax) = P(x){l-p(Ax) + 0(Ax)}, or
P' (x) = -pP(x). (4)
The solution of equation (4) is P(x) = P(0)e_px, with the
initial condition P(0) = prob.(z>0) = 1. Finally we
QX
obtain P(x) = e , and the probability density function
of z is pe xp , x>0, that is the negative exponential
density with parameter p_. Since x is a random variable
corresponding to the time between one event and the next
one, the probability that the waiting time until the next
D X
event is longer than x is e , the exponential law for
the waiting time being the only continuous distribution
12
said to be endowed with complete "lack of memory" ; in
other words, the probability that we have to wait x time
units for the next event is independent of the time we
have already waited since the last event occurred. In
the discrete case the role played by the exponential
distribution is assumed by the geometric one.
Summing up, the Poisson process is fully determined
by the negative exponential law and events occurring in
the process are referred to as events occurring at random.
While in statistics the word "random" indicates independence
of observations, the term here denotes that the Poisson
process assumes independence of occurrence of events so
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that an infinite number of poin'ts (events) is randomly
distributed over the interval [0,°°). Any Markov process,
as we noted earlier on, is characterized by the exponen¬
tial (or the geometric) law in the sense that the under¬
lying point process, the process counting the number of
transitions, is of the Poisson type.
Point, or more specifically, renewal processes have
been increasingly applied to the various branches of the
13
social sciences. Thus, Coleman emphasized the import¬
ance of the Poisson process in describing various problems
14
in sociology, and Bartholomew thoroughly examined the
application of renewal processes to the turnover of people
in an organization; finally, Massy et al15 introduced a
non-homogeneous Poisson model where purchasing decisions
made by individual families are represented as discrete
events occurring across the time axis. Nevertheless, the
role of point processes in economics has never been examined
16
before. Only Steindl tried to draw attention to the role
of these processes, we quote, "We have obvious regeneration
points in the pay-dags when wages and salaries are received,
or in the accounting periods of firms. Moreover, all con¬
sumption is a renewal process, as also is production".
Although one can hardly believe that economic pheno¬
mena can be necessarily described by a Markov process, the
known models representing stochastic processes that generate
distributions of economic variables have the Markov property.
This may be due to the existing elegant mathematical theorems
of the Markov processes, while point processes are difficult
to handle. The relevance of the negative exponential law
in the underlying point processes has never been questioned.
It may be true that this assumption reasonably describes
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actual phenomena such as the length of the telephone
conversations within a city, or the duration of machine
repairs. But when it comes to size distribution of
economic variables, such as income or earnings, it is not
at all certain whether the "lack of memory" assumption is
empirically supported or not, this particular area has
been completely unexplored.
As we will discuss in detail in the following chapter,
the distribution of earnings of an individual in a large
bureaucratic corporation cannot be merely represented or
generated by the Poisson process. If we only apply this
process then the employee's earnings are likely to change
at every point of his length-of-service', the probability
of the time elapsing until the next change of his earnings
is independent of the time already elapsed since the last
change occurred. Obviously, only at certain points of the
individual's length-of-service a change of his earnings
takes place and this is related to the wage structure which
the individual is subject to.
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CHAPTER 5: "THE BASIC MODEL".
We will examine the course of evolution of an
employee's earnings (in money terms) within the framework
of point (stochastic) processes. According to the theory
developed for those processes, we have to consider events
occurring at random points of the time axis. Let us call
each positive change in the individual's earnings an event
that occurs across his length-of-service.
As Doeringer and Piore1 have pointed out, an income
increase may be related to a promotion to the next higher
job grade in the job structure (vertical differentiation of
the wage structure), or it may be identified with an increase
due to meritorious individual performance in the same job
level (horizontal differentiation of the wage structure).
* 1
Demotions, or negative income changes, are excluded.
Each one of the income increases may correspond to a
particular amount of experience (general or specific) which
may be associated with the skills and responsibility required
* 2
for a job. Each event increases the employee's earnings,
according to a functional equation characterizing each firm
(or industry). The income increment could be a random
* i
The assumption not perhaps an important one, since - generally
speaking - if an employee was faced with a negative income
increase he would prefer to leave the firm. According to
o
Reder , employers try to avoid cutting wages due to the employee's
emotional resistance, unions playing a vital role in this respect.
Firms pursue other means of reducing labour cost per unit of
output in a depressed labour market, such as imposing more
selective methods in their hiring requirements or increasing the
standards of the various job assignments.
^ 2 o
This is reminiscent of Lydall's R factor (responsibility, or
hierarchy effect).
- 87 -
variable independent of the point process as, perhaps,
with the self-employed person. We make here, however,
the assumption that the increment is constant on a
logarithmic scale and the following equation exists:
an ,. x
y = yQ e (1)
where y is the employee's earnings, n=0, 1, 2, ..., are
the point events (or income changes), and a being a parameter,
is the increment. When n=0, we have y = y0, which is the
employee's initial income value as soon as he enters the firm,
with his length-of-service being equal to zero. Therefore,
the firm considered is characterized by an exponential growth
of individual earnings. This does not necessarily apply to
any other firm, where we might have a different functional
relationship (e.g. a linear growth of earnings). Instead of
considering one firm (or a bureaucratic corporation in the
internal labour market), we could of course refer to any wage
structure across firms, characterized by the same promotion
policy and pattern of mobility.
Let us consider two general cases (A and B) concerning
the transition (or promotion) rates from one income level to
the next; in case A, we will make the assumption that the
lengths of stay in each income level are independently and
identically distributed positive random variables, following
an arbitrary probability density function. In case B, we will
drop this assumption and we will assume some form of inter¬
dependence between the lengths of stay.
As far as case A is concerned, we will be examining
two alternative possibilities:
I. The first possibility is when transitions depend upon
seniority within each income level and the transition
4
rate (or the hazard function) is an increasing or
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decreasing function of the length of stay at the
income level;
II. The second possibility is the Markovian model when
the transition rate is constant or rather, independent
of seniority within each income level.
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A. THE INDEPENDENCE ASSUMPTION OF THE LENGTH-OF-STAY
According to the theory of point processes, any
arbitrary promotion rate is uniquely determined by the
probability density function of the continuous and positive
random variables x^ corresponding to the length-of-stay
(or seniority) in the income levels i = 1, 2, 3, n.
Assuming that the Xj_ random variables are independently
and identically distributed with a p.d.f. f(x), the time
it took an employee to reach the n^^1 income level is the
random variable Sn. Clearly, Sn = xi +Tz + ... xn and
its probability density function is given by p(Sn) =f*n(x),
which is the n^*1 convolution of f(x) with itself.
The following are well-known results in the theory
of point processes:
Let Pn(s) = Prob.{Sn <s}, and Trn(s) = Prob. (n(s) = n),
that is, the probability of attaining the n^h income level
within £ years of service. Then, n(s)>n if and only if
Sn+i ^ s. Therefore
7Tn(s) =Prob. (n(s) >n}~ Prob. (n(s) >n + l}= pn(s) -Pn +^(s) (2)
The above probabilities correspond to the distribution
of the number of income changes, or promotions, in a random
sample of employees of equal length-of-service.
We have now to consider the probability mass function
of the number of promotions in a mixed sample of employees
heterogeneous in the length-of-service. In order to do that,
we will treat the length-of-service as a continuous random
variable and derive its probability density function according
to certain assumptions regarding the rate of entry and exit
in the firm. Then we will integrate over all possible cohorts
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of employees with different lengths-of-service, thus
obtaining the stable probability mass function of the
number of promotions in a mixed sample of employees.
It would be likely that the rate of exit depends
upon two factors: first, it is an increasing function
of the individual's age, therefore the probability of
retirement or death increases with age. The second factor
is related to the employee's discontent - if he thinks he
is not satisfactorily remunerated for his services. So
the rate of exit may also be a decreasing function of the
number of income changes or promotions and, consequently,
* 3
a decreasing function of the employee's length-of-service.
It may be that the length-of-service is the only factor
critically important to the rate of exit, but it is not
easy to obtain an explicit result with any arbitrary function
of the length-of-service due to the integration problems
that appear when we consider a mixed sample of employees.
Since one of the main functions of the internal labour market
is to reduce labour turn-over, and since there is a strong
preference for permanent employment connections by both
employers and employees, we will assume that the rate of exit
is constant. The constancy of the exit rate assumption
implies that the stochastic process from which the probability
density function of the length-of-service is generated, is of
the Markovian character.
Taking into account that the rate of exit is a constant,
h(s) = m, the survival probability, that is the probability
* 3 5
Age may be a function of the length-of-service: A.Alexander has
argued that firm experience measured in years of length-of-service,
when entered explicitly, reduces sharply the impact of age upon
mobility.
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of an employee staying in the firm at least s years
g
will be: , , , N ,-/ h(x)dx
/ \ o —ms „ « /o \Y(s ) = e = e for 0 < s < » (3)
As the length of service s tends to zero the survival
probability tends to one, so the boundary condition will
be y(0) = 1.
In order to simplify further the mathematical com¬
putation, we assume that there is a constant rate of entry
per employee already in the firm, so that the number of
individuals who enter at time T is proportional to the
existing number of employees at time T. The number of
employees with length-of-service s years is determined by
the number of employees who entered the firm s years ago
times the probability of staying in the firm at least £
years, that is
v(s,T) = w(T-s) y(s), if s <T.
Consequently, the existing number of employees at time
T,K(T), is given by the equation
T
K(T) = Noy(T) + ^ w(T -T)dY(x),
where No is the initial population at time T = 0. If the
rate of entry per employee is b, we have w(T) = bK(T) ,oj(T)6T
being the expected (mean) number of individuals who enter
the firm in a small interval near T. Making the substitu¬
tion in the above expression we obtain
T
w(T) = NobY(T) + b / oj(T-t) dY(x) . (4)
o '
In essence, to(T) corresponds to the renewal density and
equation (4) is the integral equation of renewal theory with
by(T) being a defective distribution. In the context of the
renewal theory, the lengths-of-service sb of all employees
belonging to a particular, firm are independently distributed
random variables, with identical frequency distributions y(s)-
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the Malthusian parameter for by'(s) is the root, provided
it exists, of the equation:
<Ke) = b e £S dy(s) = 1, or cp(e) = bm -es -ms ,e . e ds
o o
for which we obtain e = m(b - 1) ...(5)
If the rate of entry per individual, b, is greater
than one, then the net rate of increase of the population
of employees, the Malthusian parameter e_, is positive and
the population increases. If the entry rate equals one,
then the Malthusian parameter is zero and the population
remains the same. When these cases occur, the Malthusian
parameter always exists.
Equation (4) can be solved by means of the Laplace
transforms, but before we proceed with the solution we will
derive the asymptotic estimate for to(T). Provided that the
population of employees in the firm is non-decreasing
(e >0), y(s) is not a Lattice (arithmetic) distribution
and for T sufficiently large, the solution of the renewal
equation (4) approaches a limit (renewal density theorem).
5
C e
Therefore oo(t)->- , ^-y , where
s e £S dy(s) = ^, and C =<j>' (e ) = b
o o
m(b - 1 )T
Noby(T)e eT dT = —*
m
Finally, w(T) tends to Nob e
A discrete distribution of a random variable X is called a lattice
distribution if there exist numbers ^ and _b (both positive) such
that every possible value of X can be written in the form a+kb,
where k assumes integer values.
*5 6 7
bee W. Feller and Th. E. Harris.
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Since y(s) =e , equation (4) can be written as follows:
—mt 00 mt
w(T)=Nob e + bm / to(T-x)e dx , by taking the Laplace
o
transforms of both sides we obtain
go*(u) = ^£*1 + bm ^ ^ . where to*(u) is the Laplace trans-v y m+u m + u ' ^
form of u)(T), (m+u)-1is the Laplace transform of e-mT and
*
( -
^ represents the convolution of w(T-x) and e~ . By
solving for u*(u) we obtain oj*(u) = (m _ bm)3 + u anb by
inverting, we derive the solution, u)(T) = Nob em(k~l)T>
which coincides with the asymptotic result.
If a steady-state equilibrium of the length-of-service
distribution has been established, the number of employees
with length-of-service s years at time T approaches (for
T-s sufficiently large in the case of the asymptotic
estimate):
, „ , m(b-l)(T-s) -ms ,T , m(b-l)T -mbsv(s,T) Nob e v J e = Nob e e
In order to find the density function of the length-of-service
distribution, we have to divide the number of employees with
length-of-service £ years, v(s,T), by the number of all
employees existing in the firm at time T. Therefore we have
, rpv , m(b-l)T -mbs .
„ V(s-T) = Nob e ' —2= bm e ms (6)
7 v (s , T) ds / Nob en'b"1'T e~mbs ds
o o
By combining (2) and (6) and integrating over all possible
values of the length-of-service s_, we derive the probability
mass function of the number of promotions (or income changes)
in a mixed sample of employees, that is:
T ✓ v . -bms ,
it = J u (s bm e ds, orn o n —
tt = bm { / P (s) e~bms ds - / P ,-,(s) e bms ds} (7)n o n o n 1
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The above integrals are, in essence, the Laplace trans¬
forms of the distributions Pn(s) and Pn+^(s) for bm. These
Laplace transforms can be evaluated in terms of the probab¬
ility density function of seniority in each income level
as follows:
/ P (s) e-kms ds = (km) where A. (bm) is the Laplace
o n bm ' ^
^n
transform of the density function p(Sn). But p(Sn) =f (x),
and since f n(x) represents a convolution we have A(bm)=an(bm),
that is the Laplace transform of f(x) raised to the nth power
(provided it exists). Finally, we obtain Trn=an(bm) - aI1+'''(bm).
(8)
and by substituting (1) into (8) we derive the probability
of an employee of any length-of-service having earnings, y,
which is
- £n(^) - £n (-2-)+l
= aa yQ (bm) - aa ^o (bm). (9)
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I An application where the promotion rate is an increasing
(or decreasing) function of seniority within each income
level. (The non-Markovian case).
Suppose that the x^ random variables follow the gamma
density function with parameters 0 and X, that is:
f(x) = (-Q~y) i ^ e for x >0 and 9, A>0. In this
case, the promotion rate is an increasing function of
seniority within the income level if 0>1, and it is a
decreasing one if O<0<1.9 The Laplace transform of f(x)
X 0
for bm is (^ ^ ) and substituting into (9), we obtain the
probability mass function of earnings in a mixed sample of
employees:
0
iln(& > fln(-f)+0X 'O \ n "vv ■
TT = ( ) _ C _ ^a ^O
y VX + bm; ^ A +bm;
§ InC-2-)
1 9 j a yQ
= {1 * (TTbi> > <T^b5> (10)
We can modify the above expression by letting





ny = (1 -e'^)(—) , (11)
which is the discrete form of the Pareto density. The
C0
Pareto coefficient — depends upon the rate of entry andci
exit in the firm, on the constant income increment a (on
a logarithmic scale), and on the parameters 0 and X of the
gamma density.
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II An application with a constant promotion rate.
(The Markovian case)
When the promotion rate is independent of seniority
within each income level, the random variables follow
the negative exponential density with expectation y that is
f(x) = Xe . The Laplace transform of f(x) for bm is
^ and following exactly the same procedure, we derive
again the Pareto probability mass function, the final
expression of the probability mass function of earnings being:
-c yo a
tt = (1 - e C)(—) (12)
y y
N.B: We could assume that the promotion rate of the
promotion process X is a function of either the
rate of entry or exit without this affecting the
form of the final result apart from the Pareto
coefficient, which has to be adjusted accordingly.
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B THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE LENGTH-OF-STAY.
Suppose now that the times between transitions, that
is, the length-of-stay in each income level ii, x2, .. t
are not independent random variables. We can distinguish
and examine both a probabilistic and a deterministic inter¬
dependence. Let us assume that each transition time depends
upon the previous one according to a simple (linear) func¬
tional relation. Let ii follow an arbitrary distribution
and let x. = dx. ,, where d > 0 is a constant.
1 l-1 '
Then x2 = dxi
x3 = dx2 = d2x
J jii- i
x = d = d x i
n xn-i
The sum = Xj +x2 + ...x , the time it takes an employee
to reach the n^*1 income level, is equivalent to
Sn=xi + dx x + d2Xi + ... dn~ 'xj = Xi(l+d+d2 + ... dn~1). But
9 n— I
(1 + d + d + ... d ) is the sum of a geometric series and
1 - dn
it is equal to j _ -j- .
Therefore S = ——a-— 1 and the problem is reduced to a
n 1 - d ^
simple transformation. If the continuous random variable
Xi follows the probability density function f(xi) then
/i (1 - d)S
PCS ) = (1 d) f{ (13)n
(1 - dn) 1 - dn
As in the independence assumption case, the probability to
attain the nth income level within s years of service will
be: = P^ob. {n(s)^n} - prob. {n(s)>n+l} =
P (s) — P (s), where P (s) = prob. (S < s}. Finally, in ann+i' n ^ n J '
mixed sample of employees, the probability mass function of
the number of income changes will be
TTn=(J^1^ a i (bm) - ( 1 ) cr z (bm) , (14)n
1 - dn 1 - d
where ai(bm) and a2(bm) are the Laplace transforms of
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f{(^—} and f {——respectively for bm. By
1 - dn 1 - d
substituting ^ £n for n we obtain the probability
mass function of earnings ^ in a mixed sample of employ
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APPLICATION
Let us assume for instance, that the probability of
an employee attaining the first income level is independent
of seniority, that is the transition time xi follows
the negative exponential density with expectation X 1.
-Q^s
Then (13) becomes p(S ) = ^—e 1 d and the prob-
1 - dn
ability mass function of the number of promotions in a
mixed sample of employees is:
ttd=\(1 -d){A(l-d)+ bm( 1 -dn)}-I-X(l - d){X(l -d)+bm(l- dn +1)}-1
ita(-f)
and, therefore, TTy = X(l-d){X(l-d)+bm(l-da y° )} 1 -
\ £n(-^-) +1 _ *6
-X(l - d) (X(1 - d) +bm(l - da y° )} 1. (15)
The second case arises if we assume a serial probabil¬
istic dependence between the x/s. For instance, the stochastic
equivalent of the first (deterministic) case is a first-order
autoregressive process in which the transition times obey the
law of proportionate effect. Let £n x^ = £n + £n d^ , where
the set {£n d-^} is independent of the set {£n x^} . Assuming
that the (£n d-^} are independently and identically distributed,
following the normal distribution, then for a large number of
promotions, the xfs tend to be log normally distributed. Since
the Laplace transform of the log normal distribution cannot be
easily found, this case does not lead to an explicit result.
Instead, let us assume that x. =x. . +d., where the.ds are'
l l-l
positive and continuous random variables identically and
independently distributed with a probability density function
£(d) for 0 <d<°°. Then Tn=Ti + (n-l)d, and the sum
S =Ti+T2+...t =nti + n ^K " . Suppose now that x i isn n 2 ^
a random variable, independent of d, following an arbitrary
*6
See Appendix at end of Chapter.
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T
density function f(Ti). If we put nx i = Ti or xi = the
i T
probability density function of Ti will be - f(~0- Also
by putting ^ = D, we obtain the p.d.f. of D which is
2 2
—7 £{—7 tnD}. The probability density function ofn(n-l). n(n-l) ^ ^ J
S is the convolution of the two density functions and
n J
passing into the Laplace transforms for bm we derive the
Laplace transform of P(Sn>, that is
2
/V (bm) = —5 a„ (bm,n) an(bm,n) , where a (bm,n) and
n^Cn-l) m u 11
T 2
aj-,(bm,n) are the Laplace transforms of f(~~) and £ (n( n _
respectively.
Finally, the probability mass function of the number
of promotions in a mixed sample of employees will be:
*n = ,'(n2- 1) °Tl<bm'n> °D(bm'n) -
-
n(n oT (bm,n +1) ffDCbm,n +1) (16)
and by substituting - £n (-^-) for n, we derive the probability
a Yo —
mass function of earnings.
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C. THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE INDUSTRY.
The income distribution in an industry will be the
weighted sum of income distributions of individual firms,
assuming a unique wage structure for each firm. Alterna¬
tively, if we have different wage structures across firms,
the aggregate income distribution will be the weighted sum
of the income distributions derived from each existing wage
structure. The weights attributed are related to the number
of individuals employed in the firm, expressed as a propor¬
tion of all individuals employed in the industry.
According to the length-of-service process we have
presented the number of workers employed in the firm j at
time T is
co co No
r r tnj r at u m-j(b.-l)(T-s)-m-;S, j mUb^ - 1)T/v(s,T)ds=/No.b.eJ j 'e J ds= —^ e Jv 3 ' ,
o o J J mj
where No. is the initial employee population of the firm j
1
at time T = 0 and m., b. are the rate of exit and the rate
J J
of entry per employee respectively. Therefore, the weight
attributed to firm j is
, % -1 ht m-i(b.-l)T(m.) No . e J j '
p = J J
j v/' \ — i at m-j(b.-l)TJ 2 (m.) No.e j
j = l J J
If all firms in the industry experience the same entry and
exit rates, then the weights are independent of both the
No .
time T and the entry and exit rates, that is p. = vNo^ 'J -i .
Finally, the aggregate income distribution in the industry
will be:




The present chapter was concerned with the stochastic
approach towards the problems of income differentials of
employees in bureaucratic organizations which characterize
internal labour markets. The most striking features of
these markets are that employees are organized in various
hierarchic grades, or job levels; that the probability of
moving from one grade, with its defined salary, to the next,
depends in part on the length of time that the employee has
been in that particular grade.
Basically, we presented a non-Markovian model which
dealt with the distribution and growth of earnings of
employees within a firm. At a later state, we considered
the aggregation problem, that is, the income distribution
phenomenon across firms, or wage structures, remarking that an
industry may consist of firms with different wage structures.
While presenting certain applications of the general
model, our aim has not been to derive a specific income dis¬
tribution - different assumptions lead to different results -
but to derive conclusions concerning the inequality of earn¬
ings within a wage structure. For example, we have shown that
under the hypothesis of equidistant income increments on a
logarithmic scale, the assumptions we made regarding the pro¬
motion rate of employees in our model can generate thePareto's
law with the Pareto coefficient controlling all the known
measures of inequality. Since the above coefficient depends
upon the parameters 0 and X of the gamma function, the rate
of entry and exit and the income increment, the following
basic conclusions can be drawn from the model. First, by
increasing either the rate of entry or the rate of exit, we
- 103 -
reduce the inequality of earnings. Second, by increasing
the income increment, we increase the existing inequality.
Thirdly, we have less inequality of earnings when the
promotion rate is an increasing function of seniority
within the income level (0 >1) and more inequality when
the promotion rate is a decreasing function of seniority
(0<Q<1), the Markovian case (0 = 1) being the middle point.
So far as the industry level is concerned the inequality
of earnings depends upon the existing inequality in each
individual firm or wage structure and upon the size of each
firm, the size being represented by the number of employees
working for the firm; thus, the larger the firms with a low
degree of inequality the smaller the value of the aggregate
measure of the inequality of earnings.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER FIVE.
The probability mass function of equation (15) is one
of the three highly skewed distributions derived in the
thesis, apart from the Pareto one. An explicit solution
for the statistical moments of the functions is extremely
difficult to be obtained, instead we have estimated the
mean and the second and third moments about the mean from
calculated values based on a particular set of parameter
values.
For the three probability mass functions we have obtained
two kinds of comparative results.
First, with respect to each individual function we have
estimated the effect of a change in the value of each para¬
meter on the relative skewness by holding that of the others
constant. We assume that the relative skewness
^3
Skr = -T- ,
7T2 2
where tt2 and tt3 are the variance and the absolute skewness
respectively (second and third moment), is some measure of
inequality in the distribution of labour incomes.
Secondly, we have provided some basis for a cross distribution
comparison of the relative skewness, given that the means
of the three distributions are roughly equal. The equality
of the means is derived by allocating the same value to
all common parameters and a specific set of values to the
parameters particular to each distribution.
So far as the latter case is concerned, the numerical
values and a graphic representation of each distribution are
being provided for annual incomes ranging from 3,000 to
15,600 pounds. The width of each income class is assumed to
be 300 pounds.
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By letting d = e for d f 1, equation (15) can be
written in the following form:
ttv = 1(1 - e )
1(1 - e ) + bm 1 - Z^a(—)
yQ
1(1 - e ) + bm 1 -
y o
Computer calculations have shown that by increasing either
the rate of exit or entry or the income increment, the
relative skewness of the above p.m.f. increases. On the
other hand, relative skewness decreases as either the
initial income or the parameter, 1, of the probability dis¬
tribution Ti or the parameter, c, and consequently the
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CHAPTER 6: "EXTENSIONS: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF AGE
AND ABILITY OR EDUCATION"
In our basic model, according to certain assumptions
regarding the entry and exit of employees, we derived the
distribution of earnings for any specific wage structure
within a firm or across firms; the probability mass func¬
tion of the distribution was derived to be
defined to be the Laplace transform of the probability
density function of the promotion times for the product of
the two parameters (b,m), yQ is the initial income and a
is the constant income increment on a logarithmic scale.
In this chapter we will examine the possible effects of age
and ability or educational qualifications on the promotion
process in addition to the fact that income promotion rates
are functions of the time spent at each income level.
{a (bm)
a ,'jo




It is self-evident that physical age plays an
important role in any theory seeking to explain the dis¬
tribution of earnings not only because it is always
present in the official earnings statistics (age-earnings
profiles) but also because it is related to other factors
directly influencing the marginal productivity of an
employee. We quote from Klevmarken1 "The physical and mental
ability of a young employee are usually higher than those of an old
employee, and this should have an influence on marginal productivity
and earnings in addition to experience. The rate of increase in
earnings should therefore be a function, probably a decreasing one,
of physical age". At this stage let us make another quotation
2
from Lydall's multi-factor theory of earnings distribution
where he describes age standing proxy for such factors as
experience, learning by doing, and on-the-job training, and also for
the effects of changes in ability, health and strength with age".
Lydall does not discriminate between physical and active
age (or length-of-service) but he clearly emphasizes the
importance of the physical age factor.
Let us now examine two different models incorporating
income increases due to age.
I) Income Increases Due to Age Occurring Outside the
Wage Structure.
Let Y(t) be a random variable representing the overall
earnings of any employee at age t. The size of the earnings
at that particular age can be attributed to two factors,
physical age and the length-of-service, Y(t) being their
product. Therefore we assume that these two factors combine
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multiplicatively. Quoting from Klevmarken "The most
important interaction (by statistical standards) is found between
age and job level. The salary difference between high and low job
levels increases by age or, to express it in another way, the salary
differences between young and old employees are wider at high job
levels than at low ones. One possible explanation for this result
is that there is a wider scope for experience and skill at high job
levels than at low levels".
Symbolically Y(t) = x(t).y, where -.(1)
y stands for the size of earnings according to our basic
length-of-service model and x(t) represents an income ladder
where the growth of earnings is solely attributed to physical
age. Let us consider the overall earnings difference of two
individuals having the same earnings due to age but at
different income levels in the length-of-service model, that
is the case when y^< y^ and x^(t) = X£(t). The overall
earnings difference will be: Y2(t) - Y^(t) = x( t). (yg - y-j_)
and the greater the age the wider becomes the difference,
whereas if the two factors combined additively the overall
earnings difference would be independent of age.
Although it is more likely that age and the length-of-
service are interdependent we will assume that they are
independent and generated by two different stochastic pro¬
cesses. This condition appears to be rather stringent but
it takes care of cases where external allocations occur and
employees move from one firm to another in the same industry
or across industries.
We have already examined and derived the probability
mass function of earnings y due to the length-of-service.
Let us now examine a stochastic model describing the
influence of the age factor on the growth of earnings and
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derive the probability mass function of the random
variable x(t). Since Y(t) is the product of the two
variables x(t) and y, we will finally derive the overall
distribution of earnings where both variables will be
incorporated.
The Age Model.
A deterministic model could be a good description
of the growth of individual earnings due to age since in
many cases the earnings increases take place automatically.
On the other hand, in seeking to describe reality we have
to consider the unpredictable behaviour and change of
policies of large corporations so that a probabilistic
model appears to be the proper tool to represent the influ¬
ence of the age factor upon earnings.
Let us assume that individual earnings grow according
elk
to a simple exponential equation, that is x(t) =e , ..(2)
where d is a constant income increment and k is a random
variable representing the events or the times when the
individual's earnings change as he ages.
We assume that k=0, 1, 2, ... is generated by a
non-homogeneous Poisson process,the intensity function of
which decreases with age since the employee's physical and
mental abilities or skills decline with age, and this is
normally reflected on the growth of his earnings. Let v(t)
be the intensity function of the non-homogeneous Poisson
* i







v(u) du, where t is the age at which the
o
* 2
individual becomes an active member of the labour force.
From (2) we have k = ^ Jin x(t) and the probability-
mass function of the discrete random variable x(t) is
g Jin x
a / \ -m(t) (m(t)} „ - — /0.<f>,(x) = e v =— for 1 <x<°°. ..(3)
(g x)!
By definition when t < tQ we have k = 0 and, consequently,
x(t) = 1.
Finally, the derivation of the probability mass func¬
tion of the product, Y(t), of the two independent discrete
random variables x(t) and y, a well-known problem in the
transformation of random variables theory, will proceed as
follows:
Let iT{Y(t)} be the p.m.f. of Y(t), then
-TT {Y ( t ) } = 2 <f>t(x) • TT = Y( t) =
x=l y X
1 0 1 0 / Y x
oo ^ Jin x - Jin ( ————)
= e-m(t) (m(t)}d oa (bm) y° U_a(bm)}
x = 1 ( g £n x) !
By making the substitution i = ^ Jin x, we obtain
*2
A specific intensity function that could be applied is of the
following form: V(u) = 6e ^U, where 5 and p are positive con¬
stants. The mean value function of the process will be:
t
'






—( £n Y - £n yQ - di)















{1 - a(brii)} em(t)ta <bm> - 1} - •• <4)




The above expression (4) is the probability mass function
of the earnings of a homogeneous group of individuals having
the same age and of any length-of-service. The final out¬
come is characterized by the existing similarity between the
probability mass function of Y(t) and that of y, derived as
equation (9) in chapter five; the two expressions are
identical except for the age-dependent term
_ d~
a
em(t) (a (bm) - 1} .
II) The Age Effect Incorporated into the Wage Structure.
Apparently we can influence the size of earnings if it
is assumed that the income increment of our basic model is a
function of age, that is a = A(t). Since the length-of-service
and age are assumed to be independent, the age t is treated as
a parameter. Therefore, without any additional complications,




As far as the promotion rates are concerned, the
focal point of this chapter, we can incorporate the age
effect into our basic model itself by assuming that the
promotion rate is a function of the time spent in each
income level and age.
Let T be a continuous random variable representing
the time spent in each income level (promotion time). Any
promotion rate which is a function of seniority within
each income level can be defined in terms of the probability
density function and the distribution of promotion times as
follows:
"f ( T ^
li(T) =
T ^ , where F(x) = Probab. {T > x).
p(x)dx is the conditional probability that the employee
will be promoted to the next income level between x and
x +dx, provided that he has stayed in the previous one for
time T > x. It can be shown that
-j y(u)du
F(x) = e° with initial condition F(0) = 1.
It is most likely that the effect of age on the pro¬
motion rate is an additive one, although the possibility of
a multiplicative effect should not be ignored. Let A(t) be
the probability of promotion to the next income level that
corresponds to the age effect; let also <J)(x) be the prob¬
ability of promotion that corresponds to seniority within
each income level. The overall promotion rate will be
U (x ) = 4>(x) + A (t) .
The corresponding distribution function of the pro¬
motion times will be
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y t(u)du
_ , N o -A(t) x -$( x) ,
Ft(x) = e = e . e , where
$(x) = c})(u)du. Consequently the probability
o
density function of the promotion times is
ft(x) = Kt) e"*(T) e"X(t)T + X(t) e"t(T) e"X<t)T =
= e4(t),{»(,) e~HT)* X( t) e-*(T)h ..(6)'
Following the same procedure as in our basic model
let a^Cbm) be the Laplace transform of the p.d.f.
for bm, provided it exists. But a^Cbm) = 0o{bm + A(t)},
where the latter is the Laplace transform of the expression
4>(x)e + A(t) e-<^T\





(t) = t 1 - a0 {bm + X(t)}] aQ{bm+X(t)} ..(7)
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B. Ability or Education.
Innate abilities, educational qualifications or
attributes appraised by the employer are distributed
among the firm's employees and they are usually taken
into consideration by the firm's income policy makers.
These characteristics may affect the wage structure in
various ways. Let us consider a few obvious cases, but
in order to facilitate the algebra we will assume that
earnings grow linearly as the employee moves from one
income level to the next, that is y = yQ + an. Consequently,
the probability mass function of earnings in our basic
model will be:
s (y- y0>
7Ty = (l-cr(bm)} a (bm) ..(8)
I Initial Income Corresponding to Different Levels
of Ability or Education.
Suppose that in a particular firm an individual
begins his career with an initial income yQ which is now
considered to be a random variable varying from employee
to employee according to some innate ability or some
3
acquired attribute (educational qualification).
In our case let us assume that y is a continuousJ
o
random variable, independent of the length-of-service
process, following a certain probability density function
g(yQ) for c ^ yQ < 00, where c is a minimum value. By the
*3 4
Fase in his econometric model of age-income profiles
assumes that the initial income values follow the log-normal
distribution.
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randomization of the continuous parameter yQ the proba¬
bility mass function (8) becomes conditional and the
unconditional mass function of earnings is the mixture of
tt and the probability density function g(yQ). Therefore
0
71 t ( y ) g( y )dy .yWQ / J 0
In order to clarify the above randomization of the
initial income values let us assume that g(yQ) is a trun¬
cated negative exponential function with parameter p.
° p c
Accordingly tt = e
y j





p{l - ff(bm)} a (bm)
1
~Iy°
o (bm) e py° dy
o
a y
= epc p{l - c(bm)} {-ilna(bm)+p} (a (bm) e P} a(bm) '
ci
II The Randomization of the Income Increment.
Productivity schemes or bonus schemes can be incor¬
porated into an income promotion ladder by randomizing
the income increment parameter a. Individuals whose per¬
formance has been highly evaluated by the employers are
likely to receive higher remuneration than others in the
event of income promotions. The differentiation of income
increments can be even institutionalized as it often happens
when educational qualifications are involved.
A simple model that could describe this case is the
following:
let us assume that the income increment a is a discrete
- lis -
random variable with an upper limit A. If we put - = k,
A
and assume that k = 1,2,3 ... we have a = g, and substi¬
tuting into (8), we obtain
k , N5(y-y0)
TTy = (l-a(bm)} a (bm) ..(10)
This is the conditional probability mass function of
earnings assuming the k has an observed value. Again in
order to obtain the unconditional p.m.f. we have to multiply
(10) by the probability mass function of k and sum-up over
all possible values of k.
Suppose that k follows the geometric distribution
with parameters p and q, then we have
k , s
a (y - yG)
tt = I (l-a(bm)} a (bm) p.qk =
y k = 1
- I (y- yQ)
= p{l-a(bm)}{cr (bm) - q) ..(11)
III Income Promotion Rate Being a Function of the
Length-of-Service.
In the last models of this section we will examine
two possible effects of ability on the income promotion
rates. First let us consider the case where the firm relates
the ability of an employee to his length-of-service in the
firm and, therefore, in the prevailing wage structure the
income promotion rates become functions of the length-of-
service variable. The point process in this case is a
non-homogeneous Poisson process; in chapter five we have
already examined the general non-Markovian case the promotion
rates of which are functions of seniority within each income
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level, and the specific Markovian case where the point
process involved is a homogeneous Poisson one and the
promotion rate is constant.
In our basic model we have established that the
probability mass function of the number of promotions
within a homogeneous group of employees with the same
length-of-service is
7T (s) = P (s) -P ,-(s), where n corresponds to the
n nv n+1 ' — ^
number of income promotions, s represents the length-of-
service variable and P (s) = Prob. {S < s}. The random
n n
variable Sn = + •••t represents the time required
for the nth promotion to occur.
We have also derived the probability mass function
of the number of promotions for a random group of employees
irrespective of the length-of-service, it was found to be
IT
n (Pn(s) - + e 131113 ds» where bm e bms
o
is the probability density function of the length-of-service
in the firm.
The above integral can be evaluated in terms of the
Laplace transforms to give
77
n = A-n(bm) " 'Vn + l(bm) --(12)
where An(bm) is the Laplace transform of the probability
density function P(S ) for bm.
It has been shown that the p.d.f. of the random




nfs) = e~m(s) {m(s)}tl 1pCs; e (n - 1) ! v(s), where v(s) is the








. \ -bms ,
v(s) e ds -
e-m(s) (m(s)}° v(s) e-bms ds ..(13)
o
Although an explicit solution is not always obtain¬
able, let us consider the case where the promotion rate
grows exponentially with the length-of-service, that is
v(s) =pe^" with p >o. Then m(s) = eps and (13) becomes
TT
n
-eps(ePS)n-d ps -bms „
e (n - 1)! pe ® ds "
ps. ps,n ,
-e (e ) ps -bms ,




By making the transformation e = x for 1 < x < °°, and




















. bm s ,
bm -D'
p n !
and by substituting - (y -y ) forSi o





{i (y-y ) - 5m _ ij,a w o p





Finally we will examine a similar case by considering
See Appendix at end of Chapter.
— i 21 'f
a point process,the promotion rate of which is a function
of the number of income promotions that have already
occurred. In order to simplify the presentation we will
not follow our normal procedure but we will apply the results
of the well-known Yule-Furry process.
First we will slightly alter our basic formulation
regarding the growth of earnings and we will assume that
earnings grow according to the following equation
y = yQ+a(n-l) for n = 1, 2, 3 ...
We now assume that the promotion rate is defined by
y(x) = X.n, where X is the chance of a given income
promotion to initiate a new one in time dx, and n is
the number of income changes already taken place in the
interval 0 < Sn < s.
Since the number of income changes follows the
Yule-Furry process it can be shown that the probability
mass function of n in a homogeneous group of employees
having the same length-of-service is
— Xs —Xs n 1
TTn(s) = e (1 -e ) with initial condition
probab. (n(0) = 1} =1. The p.m.f. of the number of
promotions in a random sample of employees irrespective
of length-of-service will be
oo
f -Xs., -Xs,11"-'- , -bms , , . -bmstt = e (1 -e ) bm e ds, wtiere bm e
o
is the probability density function of the length-of-service.
__ ^ g
If we consider the transformation e =x, 0<x<l, with
- -1
the Jacobian being |j \ = ^ x the above integral can be
evaluated to give
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1 — (—) 1 (n - 1) 1
bm r A ,Nn-1 j bm ^ A } ' ,iA\
7T = -T- / X (1- x) dx = —T- tt . . ( 14 )
n X o . X (bra + n) ,A
By substituting the earnings variable for n we obtain
the p.m.f. of earnings, that is
= bm (-A-) ' 4(y-yo)}! ...
A .bm 1 . \ + 1 A i{— "a *1>!
IV Promotion Rates being Functions of Ability and
Seniority within the Income Level.
In the previous model we examined the case where the
firm evaluates an employee's abilities according to his
length-of-service or the number of income promotions he has
already achieved. Let us now examine one more extension of
our basic model and assume that the promotion rate depends
on the two factors, ability and serniority within the income
level, which may combine additively; therefore the promotion
rate y^(x) = <J>(x) + X, where (x) is a function of seniority
within the income level and X the observed value of a
characteristic which is distributed among the population of
the firm's employees. On the additional assumption that X
follows a probability density function g(A) for 0 < X < °° the
unconditional promotion rate can be obtained as follows:
The conditional probability density function of the income
promotion time is
{<j>(u ) + A}du
f;y(x) ={cj>(x) +X}e , then the unconditional one
- / c})(u)du
CO CO
will be f (x ) = / g(X)f, (x)dX =e ° / {(p (x ) + X }e"AT g( A )dA
o A o
* 6
See Appendix at end of Chapter.
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Similarly, the unconditional distribution function is
X T
(<Ku) + X } du -/ 4>(u)du
F(x) = / g(X) e ° dX = e ° / g(X)e~xAdX
o o
Therefore the unconditional promotion rate is
oo oo
/ (4>(T) + X}g(X) e~xXdX /Xg(X)e~xXdX
y (x) = = <Kx) + °
/ g(X) e"xXdX / g(X) e xXdX
o o
We can proceed to the derivation of the probability mass
function of earnings my means of the Laplace transform of
the unconditional p.d.f. of the promotion times as in our
basic model.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER SIX.
A. The factorials appearing in the probability mass
function of equation (14) can be evaluated by applying
Stirling's formula




Then the above p.m.f. takes the following form:











1 , >. bm
- (y - y ) - — - 1
a w 'o' p
- 1
By changing the value of each one of the parameters,
ceteris paribus, computer calculations have shown that
relative shewness increases as either the rate of entry or
the income increment increase. In addition, the initial
income yQ, the rate of exit and the parameter p of the non-
homogeneous Poisson process are shown to be inversely related
to relative shewness. Since the promotion probabilities
depend on the total length of service by increasing the rate
of exit, the movement of employees towards the higher income




For a constant population of employees (b = l),
initial income y = 2,100 £, constant income increment
o
a = 250 £, rate of exit m = 0.2 and p = 0.11, the following






































































































B. The p.m.f. of equation (15) is
77
bm <x)! {l (y-y0)'!
Again, by applying Stirling's formula the factorials can
be approximately evaluated so that the above function becomes
•fUl.5
. e v/ 277
s<y-yo>
ia(y-y0> + i
km 7 1 / \ . i
— +a(y-y0) + 1
bm
- 1
km , 1 , N
— +i (y-y0) + 1
In this model our calculations have shown that relative
skewness increases as either the rate of entry or exit increases
The promotion probabilities depend upon the number of previous
income promotions, and by increasing the rates of entry or
exit the expected number of income promotions for a period of
completed length-of-service is reduced; the low income classes
increase in size relative to the high income ones, and conse¬
quently, inequality increases.
On the other hand, relative skewness was shown to
decrease when either the initial income y , the parameter X,
or the income increment a increase. No apparent reason seems
to justify the inverse relationship between the income incre¬
ment a and relative skewness, although both the variance and
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Chapter 7:
"EXTENSIONS: DEMOTIONS OR NEGATIVE INCOME CHANGES"
Within the framework of point processes we will
seek to explain the distribution of the incomes of the
self-employed and the earnings of the workers in the
secondary market. Again we will be focussing our attention
on the points of time when the income of a particular
individual changes (event) rather than on the size of the
income increment itself. The time parameter in our model
will be the individual's age t_ - in this case the effect of
the length-of-service is negligible - but, assuming that
the individual enters the labour force at a certain age ti
and that age is a simple linear transformation of the
length-of-service, that is t = s + ti, the time parameter of
our point process can still be the length-of-service
s = t - 11 for s >0.
A. The Earnings of Workers in the Secondary Market.
The secondary market is defined by Doeringer and
Piore1 as a group of low wage, marginal firms where work
opportunities are casual and unstructured. Other character¬
istics are poor working conditions, little chance of promo¬
tion and on-the-job training, and personal (therefore
arbitrary) administrative procedures. So far as the labour
force in the secondary sector is concerned,workers have
inadequate skills and educational qualifications, exhibit
high turnover and their attitudes and demographic traits
favour low job attachment. There is no complete and decisive
dichotomy between the primary sector and the secondary one.
Some jobs in internal labour markets with many entry ports,
short mobility clusters and low paying work tend to resemble
- 130 -
the ones in the secondary sector. There is also some
secondary employment attached to internal labour markets
in which the remainder of the jobs are primary.
According to the segmented market theorists the
factors that foster secondary labour markets are related
to both the demand and the supply side of the market.
Certain workers, particularly part-timers, due to demo¬
graphic characteristics and social environment develop
negative attitudes towards permanent employment and promo¬
tion opportunities. On the other hand, employers in the
secondary sector cannot efficiently create internal labour
market conditions and also, due to the technical aspects
of certain jobs, they are indifferent to the reduction of
labour turnover and to investment in training on the job.
It is more likely that employee instability and unstable
jobs are correlated, their joint effect being the establish¬
ment of secondary markets.
Whenever unstable employment relations exist, the
costs of labour organization and bargaining power are high
relative to the potential advantages obtained by the Trade-
Union members. This is one of the reasons explaining the
lack of unionization in the secondary market. Another, less
obvious one, is the fact that many unions in the primary
sector in order to guarantee permanent employment relations
for their members are forced to adopt policies the side-
effect of which is the existence of a labour pool of tempor¬
ary workers. Therefore the costs of economic instability
in the internal markets are conveyed to non-unionized
internal markets and to the secondary sector.
Since in the secondary market there are no mobility
clusters and institutionalized wage structures, the earnings
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of a worker can be attributed to two independent factors,
both of which are related to the individual's age. The
first factor is the worker's physical strength or abilities.
With increasing age, we can assume that his earnings begin to
decrease as soon as he enters the labour force, and assuming
an exponential decline of earnings, this factor can be defined
cL k s
as e , where a is a constant increment on a logarithmic
scale, and kx is a random variable generated by a point (Poisson)
process. The point events of the process correspond to the
negative changes of the worker's earnings. The second factor
is discipline or the ability to conform. This ability
increases with age, and so it contributes to the worker's
growth of earnings. Again we assume an exponential growth
of earnings, that is the second factor can be defined as
ea where a is, as above, the constant increment and k2
is a random variable generated by a Poisson process. This
time the point events of the process correspond to positive
changes of the worker's earnings.
If we assume that the above factors combine multi-
plicatively and that each worker starts with an initial
income value X , then his earnings at age s =t -ti will be:
y(s) = XD ea{kz(s) -ki<s>> ..(1)
When t = 11 (or s=0) by definition we have k2 , k i = 0 .
Another case may arise when we have a linear decline
or growth of earnings and the two factors affect the indivi¬
dual's earnings additively, so that the worker's earnings
can be y(s) = Xq + a{k2(s) - k^s)} . Our analysis will be
concerned with the former case.
Before we proceed with the mathematical formulation
of the model, we would like to elaborate on one particular
aspect of the worker's retirement. As long as the worker
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is an active member of the labour force we will always
have k2?*- k^, since it is very unlikely for a worker to
accept a remuneration lower than his initial income,
that is the income he started with at the minimum age he
was qualified to enter the labour market. Due to govern¬
ment intervention (establishment of minimum rates) we will
assume that if the worker's earnings fall below XQ, then
the worker is automatically considered to be retired.
Therefore k^ -^<0 is an absorbing state for the process.
NB: Given that the point processes are of the Poisson
type, and if we assume that not all the events corres¬
ponding to income changes are counted but each
positive change occurring is counted with a probability
p and each negative change is counted with a probability
q, then the point processes are still of the Poisson
2
type.
I. The Model (Randomized Random Walks).
In order to derive the distribution of earnings of
a manual worker, we have to examine the probability mass
function of the discrete random variable k2 - ki, in essence
the r.v. k2-k4 represents the difference between two
Poisson variables. Let us assume that the expectation of
the process k2 is A_s and the expectation of the process kx
3
is £s. It has been shown by W.Feller that the distribution
of the difference of two independent Poisson variables is
identical with the distribution generated by a time-dependent
randomized random walk with the probability of one step
upwards (or positive jump) being ^ + p , and the probability
of a negative jump being ^— . We also have to note thatA + p
in the above-mentioned random walk the time between two
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consecutive transitions follows the negative exponential
distribution with expectation { ( A +p)s} 1 .
The probability mass function of the random variable
k = k - k1 is
k
Pg(k = k2 - kx) = (^-) e-(-X + P)S Ik (2 s v'A • P ) • ^
for k = 0, ±1, ±2, ±3, ...
I , is known in the literature as the Bessel function ofk
imaginary argument. The above function of order k is
defined by:
T 00 fcjv/i—
J_ (2 s\/A . p) = 2 V ! (k + v ) ! ' and i1: has a SeneratinS
v=0
function of the form
+°° kT i /- ~1 \
2 n J_ k (x) = X(u +u )
k=-°°
From equations (1) and (2) we can derive the proba¬
bility mass function of the earnings y,
Ps(y)=(p)2a X° e~U +P)SIl m (-2.) (2S'/XT?), (3)
a X0
for Xq < y <00 , since y < Xq is an absorbing state. The
probabilities P (y) correspond to the distribution of earn-s
ings of a sample of secondary workers in the same age.
II The Distribution of Earnings of a Mixed Sample of
Secondary Workers.
If we consider a random (mixed) sample of individuals
heterogeneous in age, we will have to treat age as a contin¬
uous random variable and introduce the limiting age distri¬
bution of the secondary workers. Finally, we will have to
integrate over all possible cohorts of workers with different
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ages, thus obtaining the probability of any worker,
regardless of age, having earnings y. We can apply the
assumptions and procedure we followed in order to derive
the limiting length-of-service distribution in the case
of primary employees, but we have to elaborate on the
assumptions related to the rate of exit of employees in
the secondary sector. First, we assume that due to demo¬
graphic reasons there is a constant rate of exit d.
Secondly, we have to take into account the absorbing state
of the process, that is the probability that the worker's
earnings will decline and become less than his initial
income value, so that he will be forced to leave.
* 1
Let u(s) =Probab. {y(s) ^Xq}, the overall exit rate will
u' (s )be
u ^ + d = h(s) for s>0, and the survival probability,
as an active member in the labour force, will be:
els
y(s) = u(s) e for s X), with boundary condition y(0) =1.
Again we assume that there is a constant rate of
entry per worker b, and the Malthusian parameter is the root
00
—es
e of the equation <j> (e) = b/e dy(s) =1. Since in this
—
o
case the parameter £_ cannot be easily estimated in terms of
the entry and exit rates, the limiting age distribution will
be a function of it. As in chapter five w(T), being the
expected number of individuals who enter the secondary market
el
in a small interval near T, asymptotically tends to No be
Therefore the number of workers of age s = t - t^ years at
time T approaches, for T-s sufficiently large,
v (s ,T) ->- No be£^ - s' y(s) .
* 1
In essence l-u(s) is the probability of the first passage
through k= k2 - kx < 0 at epoch s. See W. Feller4,and
D. R. Cox and H. D. Miller5.
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The limiting age distribution is
/ mN ^ e(T-s) / . -es , .v(s,T) _ Nob e y(s) _ e y(s)
oo oo oo




-ps 1 ~ k e_£sdy(s> 1 ~ k h - 1




v(s ,T) _ eb e~£Sy (s) _ eb e-(-£ + d")s u(s). ,
b - 1 b - 1 K }
f v(s,T)
o
By combining (3) and (4) and integrating we obtain
°° Ps(y) be — fe + d")<=;
TTy = / u(s) b _ J e ; u(s)ds, in the distribution
we are counting the workers who are still in the labour






The integral / ^ ^_£ j e ^£ d^S Pg(y)ds is, in essence
o
the Laplace transform of P (y) for e + d and it can be
o
7




y = X(6 - g) > where (5)
6 = A + p + e + d+ Z (A + p + e + d)2 - 4Ap and
2 A
r = A + p + e + d- /~(A + p + e + d)z - 4Ap
2 A
Provided that p + e + d - A > 0 we will have 6 > 1 and by
putting Zn 6 = c and substituting into (5) we obtain
*2 6




tt = , £ (—) , this being the Pareto law
y b-lwcrsvy 'A(e -£) J
in the discrete form. The Pareto coefficient — = AHi
a a
depends upon the rates of the two Poisson processes, the
income increment on a logarithmic scale, the Malthusian
parameter e and upon the demographic rate of exit d.
As in our basic model our aim has not been to derive
the Pareto distribution but, rather, to analyze the mechan-
sim of the distribution of earnings in the secondary market
applying the theory of point processes. Our basic assumption
in this model has been that in the secondary market positive
or negative income increments occur at random due to unstable
employment relations. The application of Non-Markovian point
processes, where the hazard functions depend upon the
worker's age, could be a more realistic approach but it would
greatly complicate the derivation of explicit mathematical
results.
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B. The Incomes of the Self-employed.
As in the model explaining the earnings of secondary
workers we must allow for demotions or negative income
increments. The income of a self-employed fluctuates in
the same way as the sales of a firm increase or decrease
at random points in time.
It would be more realistic to assume that in the
case of the self-employed the size of the income increment
is not a parameter determined by government legislation or
customary law, it is a random variable that could be
related to the number of positive income changes in the
sense that as the self-employed person gains in reputation
he demands a greater reward for his services. But this is
not always the case since the individual's reward (or fees)
may be constrained by institutional regulations or profess¬
ional ethics (according to the specific service or commodity
provided). Apart from the above constraint the person might
obtain monopoly power (i.e. a famous surgeon and, consequently,
he will charge discriminating fees to different customers
in order to maximize his profits). Therefore, generally
speaking, we will assume that the size of the income incre¬
ment is a random variable following a distribution independ¬
ent of the point process.
The Model.
Let again be a random variable corresponding to
the number of positive income changes (events) and k^ b.e a
random variable corresponding to the number, of . negative
income changes. Also let a be a random variable, independ¬
ent of the point process, representing the size of the
income increment.
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The random variables k2 and kx are again generated
by two independent Poisson processes with expectations _As_
and jos respectively, A and p being positive constants. The
independence assumption behind the two processes appears to
be a realistic one. The loss of a customer that could be
associated with a negative event has no effect upon the
individual's probability of acquiring a new customer
(positive event) unless we assume that in the market exists
perfect knowledge on the part of all customers (or buyers),
the latter case representing a completely idealised situation.
Assuming that the person's income grows exponentially
his income level at age t = s +ti will be
y(s) = ealk*(s) - 1 (6)
for 0 < y(s) < °°, that is k2 -ki <0 is an absorbing state
for the process. When t =ti or s = 0 we have by definition
k2 = kj = 0 or y(s) = 0.
If we follow the same procedure as in the case of
secondary workers, and provided that the random variable a
has an observed value a, the conditional probability mass
function of y will be:
c
be 1 f 1 Na.
y/a=a b-1 x(eC-C) y+1
Let us now assume that a is a discrete random
A
variable with an upper limit A. If we put — = x, forci
1 X
x = 1,2,3,..., we have — = -j, and substituting into (7) wed. n
obtain
c x
Uy/x=x= ^ A(ecl-0 (7^T) ' (8)
In order to obtain the unconditional probability
mass function of incomes we have to multiply (8) by the
p.m.f. of x and sum up over all possible values of x-
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Suppose that x follows the geometric distribution with
parameters p and q, then we have
CO _
v be 1 r / A-iX x— 1
\ = n .. c {<y+1) >■" x=l A(e - £ )
pb£ i
.. (9)
(b - 1) A (eC - O j
(y + D - q
We should note, however, that a more realistic approach
would include the assumption of a minimum critical income
value, different from the institutionalized initial level
of earnings assumed in the case of secondary market workers.
This minimum income, y . , may be related to minimum sub-' •'mm' 17
sistence level and to fixed costs that a self-employed
person has to face.
Without altering the structure of the model the final
p.m.f. of incomes becomes in this case:
_ p d e
7T —







Since q <1 and for large values of y the above probability
mass function, just like the one in (9), can be approximated
by the Pareto law.
As far as inequality is concerned one important
conclusion that can be derived is that an increase in the
income increment, in the case of secondary market workers, or
an increase in the maximum income value A, in the case of
self-employed individuals, decreases the Pareto coefficient
and, consequently, increases the inequality of incomes.
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CHAPTER 8: REPERCUSSIONS, AND A CONCLUDING NOTE.
A. Repercussions Related to Consumption Theory.
An important repercussion of our proposed models may
be related to the application of the theory of consumer
behaviour in internal labour markets and, in particular, to
the specification of the relationship between labour incomes
and individual consumption in the above markets. There are,
however, other variables which influence the level of indivi¬
dual consumption; socio-economic characteristics such as age,
family size, wealth and expectations play a vital role in
determining the amount of spending of an employee.
In the literature there are four main theories postu¬
lating a particular relationship between consumption and
income in terms of individual behaviour, and at a later stage
applied to aggregate behaviour. Before we put forward a
hypothesis elucidating the effect of earnings upon individual
consumption in internal markets let us examine each general
theory in turn.
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I The Absolute Income Hypothesis.
This hypothesis originated from rieynes1 and its
two essential points are that real consumption expenditures
* 1
are a stable function of real income and that the mar¬
ginal propensity to consume is a positive number, less
than one. The hypothesis has followed one of two forms;
the first form relates the level of consumption to current
income and other variables, that is C = a +bY +cZ +u, where
C represents consumption, Y is income, Z is a set of other
variables, u is a stochastic term and a, b, c are parameters.
C C
The second form is
^ = ai +biY + CiZ + Uj, where ^ as the
consumption to income ratio. In the above two relations
u or ui are assumed to be independent of consumption, an
3 * 2
assumption that Ferber considers rather unrealistic
In fact Keynes supported the thesis that consumers were not
O
subject to money illusions but, as Ackley points out, this
may not be true at least in the short run.
We must note that in theory consumption functions are the
complement of saving functions and they can be applied inter¬
changeably in the hypothesis.
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II The Relative Income Hypothesis.
4
Brady and R.Friedman introduced the assumption
that the saving rate depends on the relative position of
the individual on the income scale and not on the absolute
level of income. Therefore, incorporating the above
assumption into the consumption equation, we obtain
C Y ~
y = a +b— , where a, b are constants and Y represents the
Y
5
average income. At a later stage Duesenberry provided
psychological support - within a social framework - for
this hypothesis by arguing that individuals have a strong
tendency to emulate their neighbours and also to strive
towards a higher standard of living. His main points were
that an individual's consumption habits are influenced by
the consumption habits of those with whom he associates, and
that it is harder for a family to reduce expenditures than
to refrain from making them in the first place. For this
reason people seek to maintain at least the highest standard
of living obtained in the past, and once a new higher stan¬
dard of living is attained, individuals are reluctant to
return to a lower level when their incomes go down.
According to Duesenberry, ceteris paribus, a person's
average propensity to save will be a rising function of his
percentage position in the income distribution. More speci¬
fically, a person's utility function depends on relative
consumption expenditures, that is
C. C. C. A. A.
Ui ~ f(R~ ' IT ' ~R~ ' ~R± I") ' where uj_ 1S
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the utility function of the ith individual, the value
of assets of the ith individual in the k th period, is
the consumption expenditure of that person in the k th
period and FL = ? a^ is the weighted average of the
consumption expenditure of others in the community. Each
person maximizes his utility function subject to current
and future incomes, interest rates and assets.
Duesenberry inferred that from a time-series point
of view the relative income hypothesis can be expressed by
making the consumption rate a function of the ratio of
current income to the highest level of income previously
obtained, a simple algebraic form being
Ct Yt




Davis suggested a different version of the relative
income hypothesis by substituting previous peak consumption
for previous peak income. He argued that people become
adjusted to a certain level of consumption rather than to a
level of income and, consequently, it is past spending that
influences current consumption.
Davis based his version of the hypothesis on the
additional argument that current income is likely to be less
stable and less representative of a family's living standard
than current consumption.
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Ill The Permanent Income Hypothesis.
In an attempt to explain the stability of consump¬
tion outlays among non-wage earner families with varying
7
incomes from period-to-period, M. Friedman put forward
his permanent income hypothesis which is based upon three
assumptions. First a consumer unit's observed income Y
and consumption C in a particular period consist of two
components, the "transitory" and the "permanent" one.
Symbolically Y = Y^ +Y^
C = C + C. .
p t
The permanent income is the average income a household
expects to earn during its planning horizon; in a given
period of time it is a function of the wealth of the consumer
unit, estimated as the discounted present value of a stream
of future expected receipts, and the rate r (or a weighted
average of a set of rates) at which the expected receipts
are discounted.
The second assumption is that permanent consumption
is a multiple k of permanent income, that is
Cp = k(i, w, u).Y , where k, being a factor of propensity,
is a function of the interest rate i, the ratio of non-human
to total wealth w, and a variable u of which age and tastes
are principal components. Therefore Friedman assumes that
k and Y^ are independent.
Thirdly, the transitory and permanent income components
are assumed to be uncorrelated, the same assumption being
applied to transitory and permanent consumption, and to
transitory consumption and transitory income. Friedman's
example of the permanent income hypothesis is the following:
Let R1; R2 be an individual's income in years 1 and 2, and
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let i be the rate of interest. The individual's expected
wealth at the beginning of year 1 is
R
Wi = Hj + ]_ + i , and so the consumption expenditure
in year 1 is Cj = f(wx,i) = f(Ri + 1 ^ z±).
More generally C = f(Y , i)= F(w ,i), where t refers
U L U u L
to a specific point in time.
Friedman argues that at a certain point on the
/\
income-axis mean measured income, Y , is equal to mean
A
permanent income, Y . Individuals who have a permanent
income greater than the mean one tend to have a positive
transitory income too. On the other hand, those who have
A A
Y < Y tend to have a negative transitory income,
p m J
Summing up, according to this hypothesis the con¬
sumption outlays are a constant proportion k of the
^ 3
permanent income level , the value of k varying for con¬
sumer units of different types and of different tastes.
The observed level of consumption and income deviate from
the permanent (or planned) levels by the amount of the
transitory components which are random and independent of
each other.
There is considerable doubt regarding the validity
of two assumptions, the independence between the proportion¬
ality factor k and the level of income, and the lack of
correlation between transitory consumption and transitory
g
income. Friend and Kravis remark that according to the
permanent income hypothesis "low-income families will have no
*7
Friedman suggests that a proper weighted average of the incomes of
a homogeneous group (i.e. occupation) seems to be a good approxi¬
mation for the permanent components for that group.
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greater preference for purchase of future goods than will high-
9
income families". Duesenberry raises the same point.
The basic argument is that consumer units at different
income levels will have different kinds of pressures and
motivations. The assumption of a zero marginal propen¬
sity to consume out of transitory income is also question¬
able since low-income consumer units are under strong
pressures to spend any unexpected income to meet current
needs, and since an unequal distribution of wealth can
persuade low-income families to save in order to maintain
consumption in the face of temporary declines in income.
Hamburger10 suggested a different version of the
permanent income hypothesis by postulating that the total
current consumption outlays depend mainly on tastes, the
interest rate and the discounted value of life-time
resources which are in turn determined by the sum of
wealth and a multiple of the consumer's current wage rate.
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IV The Life-cycle Hypothesis.
Modigliani, Ando and Brumberg11 gave a different
interpretation to the concept of permanence by considering
permanent wealth rather than permanent income. They assumed
that the utility function of an individual depends upon his
aggregate consumption in current and future periods until
death. The consumer maximizes his utility function subject
to the available resources, the resources being the sum of
current and discounted future earnings over his life-time
and his current assets. The amount allocated to consumption
is a certain proportion of these resources, that is the
utility function is homogeneous - of any positive degree -
with respect to consumption at different points in time.
The planning horizon of the individual is his whole
life-time. Persons try to spread life-time consumable
resources evenly over their lives. More specifically they
accumulate enough savings during their earning years to main¬
tain the same standard of living during retirement. The
division of life between the earning-span and retirement is
taken as an institutional fact.
Finally, it is assumed that the individual neither
expects to receive nor desires to leave any bequest; the
proponents of the hypothesis, however, do not consider the
above assumption a very stringent one.
The hypothesis can be expressed as follows:
T T T T
Ct = U^, where, as in the permanent income hypothesis, k^
is a factor of proportionality which depends upon the form of
the utility function (the consumer's tastes), the interest
T
rate and the present age of the person. is total consump¬
tion of a person of age T in year t. One of the most interest-
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ing aspects of the hypothesis is the factor , the
present value of resources at age T and in year t. The
above factor can be defined by the following equation:
T
T
m rp m n Y, "J1
U = a 1 + Y + 2 = , where Y denotest t 1 t t=T+1 (1 + it)T _i r
non-property income at age T and in year t, and i is the
Tx
real rate of return on assets. The variable represents
the expected earnings of an individual T in the xth year of
his life.
Th 2 7p = Y^(n-T), where Y^ ise component , . Xx-T t ' t^ x=T+l (1 + i )
the average annual expected income and n is the earning-span
of the individual.
Finally, according to the life-cycle hypothesis, the
total consumption of an individual of age T in the year t
will be:
rp rPrP T» ^rp mrp
Ct = kt Yt + kt (n"T) Yt + kt at-f
The next step considered by Aldo and Modigliani is
the aggregation procedure, first they aggregate within each
T
age group and then over all the age groups. In case k is
different for each individual in the age group the authors
12 T
argue that under certain conditions, stated by Theil,
can be shown to represent the weighted averages of the
individual proportionality factors.
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V On Consumption Theory in Internal Labour Markets:
A Proposed Synthesis.
By presenting the above brief survey of the four
main hypotheses regarding consumer behaviour our intention
has not been to emphasize the short-comings of each theory,
this would require a detailed critical analysis of both the
* if
theoretical and the empirical part of the theories. On a
micro-economic basis each hypothesis suggests a certain
relation between consumption and income; the latter is
considered to be a general concept including earnings and
income from other sources, although the life-cycle hypothesis
proceeds a step further and considers the earnings of an
individual separately. This is a point that has not been
given considerable attention by the hypotheses, that is the
lack of any insight into the relation between individual
consumption and earnings.
We consider this problem even more important in
internal labour markets with their stable employment rela¬
tions and well-defined income ladders which determine the
employee's labour income streams across his earning-span
and, consequently affect his consumption pattern.
The proposed relation between earnings and an employee's
consumption pattern in the internal market is rather a
synthesis than a rejection of the assumptions incorporated
in the four hypotheses.
Apart from other variables that are not considered in
this model, the total consumption of an individual i with
*4
Numerous tests of each hypothesis exist in the literature; the
most recent and integrated one is by Singh, Drost and Kumar.
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s years of service in the firm j, can be a function of his
current earnings, the expected value of the earnings of
employees with the same length-of-service and the expected
value of the earnings of all employees employed by firm j.
/\ /N
Symbolically we have C. . = f(Y. .(s), Y.(s), Y.), where1J s i J J j
Cbjs is the consumption of the individual i in firm j, and
with s years of service. Y. .(s) corresponds to the earningsJ
of the employee i in the firm j with s years length-of-service;
the dependence of consumption on this variable is in accord¬
ance with the Keynesian hypothesis that current consumption
* 5
depends on current income.
A
The second variable Yj(s) is the expected value of
the probability mass function
Vs) =Pitn (i)(s» - piln (JL)+1(S) deriveda vyD a y0
as equation (2) in chapter five. It is reminiscent of Aldo
and Modigliani's concept of "average expected income", and
in our case it corresponds to the average earnings the
employee expects to earn at the sth year of his length-of-
service in firm j.
A
Finally the third variable, Y. is the expected value
J
of the probability mass function
a £n (—) _ £n + 1
T = a (bm) - a (bm)y° , derived as equation (9)
in chapter five. This variable corresponds to the average
earnings the employee expects to earn across the whole wage
structure in firm j. The dependance of consumption on this
variable is related to Duesenberry's suggestion that indivi¬
duals tend to emulate their neighbours; in our case they are
"*3
A proper presentation of such a model should include a time
parameter t.
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greatly influenced by the consumption patterns of the
other employees in the firm. This may be a more realistic
approach since an employee will associate with his
colleagues rather than with his neighbours.
The same variable is also reminiscent of Friedman's
permanent income since it represents the expected value of
earnings of a homogeneous group subject to a particular
income promotion ladder or wage structure.
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B. A Final Concluding Note.
In the previous chapters we presented various
stochastic models explaining the growth and distribution
of labour incomes in segmented labour markets focussing
our attention on internal labour markets. Our intention
in the present thesis has been neither to provide a curve
fitting exercise nor to test empirically a suggested hypo¬
thesis related to a specific shape of the distribution of
labour incomes.
Although in the literature there are quite a few
theories of the size distribution and growth of earnings, no
general theory exists that could incorporate observed patterns
on the micro-economic level. Neoclassical analysis remains
silent at this point since its marginal productivity theory
explains the determination of labour incomes - under very
stringent conditions - but not their distribution. This
thesis has tried to fill this gap by providing the methodo¬
logical framework within which observed wage structure across
firms or income promotion ladders in a firm could be analysed.
We do not pretend that we have succeeded in providing an
overall theory of the size distribution of labour incomes or
in unveiling all the factors that could influence the distri¬
bution. Some of these factors are highly qualitative in
nature, and to provide a general quantitative theoretical
framework seems to be a formidable task that requires further
research. Unfortunately the mathematical problems involved
and the complicated economic rationale behind any wage struc¬
ture present serious obstacles which are not easily overcome.
We must note, however, that our principal aim has been the
derivation of explicit results, where possible, rather than
the exploration of, perhaps, more realistic models that
would require the application of simulation techniques.
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Finally certain parameters of the models such as
the rates of entry into the firm and exit, and the income
increment have been treated as constants. They could be
easily treated as functions of certain economic variables;
for instance, the income increment in the basic model of
chapter five could be a function of the rate of growth of
the firm measured by the volume of sales or by the level
of profits. The same principle may be extended and applied
to the income promotion structure. The promotion rate (or
the hazard function) could be a function of seniority within
each income level and of the firm's output, that is
y(x,q) = 4>(t) + ?(q), where y(x,q) is the promotion rate,
<f> (x) a function related to seniority within each income
level and £(q) is a function of output. Then we can apply
the procedure followed in our basic model without the mathe¬
matical results being affected.
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